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SORRY, THEY WERE ON MUTE:
THE SEC'S "TOKEN PROPOSAL 2.0" AS BLUEPRINT FOR
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO CRYPTOCURRENCY

J. Scott Colesanti*
Abstract
In 2008, as the world dreaded economic meltdown,

one or more anonymous

individuals titled "Nakomoto" posted a scientific white paper on the Internet. "Bitcoin"
was thus born. That name - uttered but once in the white paper- would go on to define a

movement, a market, and a mountain.
By late 2010, approximately

100

bitcoin had been mined; two years later, that

number approached 10 million, and a second crypto had emerged. By 2018, bitcoin traded
at over $18,000 per coin; a year later, that market value had plummeted to less than
$5,000. Concurrently, tales of digital asset fortunes lost or stolen have abounded. Thus,
the growth of cryptocurrency, while meteoric, has been dampened by theft, volatility, and
misuse.
The peer-to-peer transactional system imagined by Nakomoto could hardly be said
to have welcomed regulation. And yet, with a market cap measured in the trillions,
cryptocurrency is on a path to inevitable regulation. And the Securities and Exchange
Commission

-

the most feared of market regulators - can seemingly use its expansive

definition of "security"to reach almost any digital asset arrangement tied to speculation.
Accordingly,

Part II of this Article provides

background on the definition of

"security" as introduced by the federal securities laws. Next, PartIII brings a tighter lens
to the cases brought by the Commission for the purpose of juxtaposing the two recent

"Token" proposals offered by an SEC Commissioner. Finally, Part IV suggests
amendments to the bold proposal/quasi-rulemaking. In the main, these amendments
concern definitions, the suggested public disclosures, and the harmonization with salutary

Commission pronouncements to date.

* J. Scott Colesanti, LL.M., is a Professor of Legal Writing at the Hofstra University
School of Law, where he has taught Securities Regulation for over 20 years. Professor
Colesanti is a former Trial Counsel for The New York Stock Exchange Division of
Enforcement. He was also an industry arbitrator for a decade and regional counsel for a
national broker-dealer. He is admitted to the Bars of three jurisdictions and has
taught/lectured abroad on six occasions. A frequent contributor to legal periodicals,
Professor Colesanti has also authored a number of books. His "Fairness, Inc.: The Origins
(and Billion-Dollar Bonuses) of Rule lOb-5 as America's Insider Trading Prohibition" was
released in 2018. His current podcast, "Stock Law Now," addresses issues of interest to
investors and regulators alike in lighthearted fashion.
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In sum, the unconventional Token 2.0 proposalhas inspireda CongressionalBill and
emboldened the industry. This article lauds the initiative while suggesting the means by
which it can crystallize into permanent, efficacious regulation.

I. INTRODUCTION: PLENTY IN A NAME
A.

Crypto's Rough and Tumble Start

In 2008, as the world dreaded economic meltdown, one or more anonymous
individuals posted a scientific "white paper" on the Internet. 1 The formal
scholarship suggested that internet merchants and their counterparties could avoid
fiat currency (i.e., currency backed by nations) as well as credit card/bank fees
through direct barter; that barter would be effectuated by a cyberspace creation
termed "bitcoin." 2 That name - uttered but once in the white paper - would go on
to define a movement, a market, and a mountain.
Most immediately, those willing to dedicate computer time and smarts could
"mine" bitcoin - that is, solve complex algorithmic challenges in search of a
reward of a modest amount of the digital assets.3 Such transactions could be
communally "verified" by a "chain of digital signatures" on a sophisticated but
public computer network called "blockchain."4
Unnamed parties around the globe accepted the challenge. By late 2010,
approximately 100 bitcoin had been mined; 5 two years later, that number
approached 10 million, and a second crypto had emerged.6 Contemporaneously,
mined coins were sold to others using the internet. Digital, as a blossoming,
decentralized ledger, has since set the standard for digital accounting. 7
In terms of steady value, bitcoin and the oddly futuristic other alt-currencies

1 Satoshi Nakomoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Jan.
3, 2022), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
2Id. Interestingly, Nakomoto's 9-page paper (with only 8 footnotes) includes
the term

"bitcoin" only in its title.
3 The bitcoin "source code" is said to limit mining to 21 million coins in total. See
Adam Hayes, What Happens to Bitcoin After All 21 Million Are Mined?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb. 28, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/what-happens-bitcoin-after-21million-mined/. As of September 2021, there are 18.82 million coins in circulation. See
infra note 5.
4 NAKOMOTO, supra note 1, at 2-4.
5 Raynor de Best, Number of Bitcoin (BTC) in circulationas of September 13, 2021,
STATISTA (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/247280/number-of-bitcoinsin-circulation/.
6 Id.
7 See Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. Bus.
REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.

4

CORP. & Bus. L.J.

Vol. 3:1: 2022

took years to enter the mainstream. By 2013, bitcoin reached a value of
approximately $1,100 each.8 Yet, a wariness of anonymous payment systems was
well-founded; an academic study that year concluded that 45 percent of the bitcoin
exchanges had gone under, resulting in several taking the money of their customers
with them.9 Indeed, in February 2014, Mt. Gox, the first cryptocurrency exchange,
filed for bankruptcy after 850,000 bitcoins went missing. 10 The resulting legal
proceedings continue in multiple nations until this day. Separately, within months
of bitcoin's launch, the criminal implications were notorious and actively pursued
by prosecutors."
The cybersecurity threat has never subsided. It was estimated that crypto assets
amounting to almost $1 billion were stolen in 2018 from platforms around the
world." In March 2019, $195 million worth of cryptocurrency was lost when the
owner of a cryptocurrency trading platform died in sole possession of its digital
key. The debacle foisted the trading platform into court protection, prompting calls
for national legislation by the Canadian Securities Administrators.1 3
Likewise, the dangerous mix of inexplicable popularity and sheer volatility has
warranted inevitable comparisons between the crypto hysteria and the disastrous
Dutch tulip bubble craze of the 1600s. In 2013 alone, bitcoin rose over 700%. By
late 2015, the pricing gains of 2013 had dissipated, and bitcoin was priced a lowly
$245.14 By 2018, bitcoin traded at over $18,000 per coin; a year later, that market
value had plummeted to less than $5,000. Regardless of (or perhaps because of)
these demonstrable swings, the investment potential of alt-currency had far

' Georgia Williams, Bitcoin: A Brief Price History of the First Cryptocurrency,
NEWS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://investingnews.com/daily/tech-investing/
blockchain-investing/bitcoin-price-history/#:~:text=Bitcoin%20price%20history%3A%
20A%20response,price%20performance%2C%202010%20to%202021.
INVESTING

9 Ian Steadman, Study: 45 percent ofBitcoin exchanges end up closing, WIRED U.K.

(Apr. 26, 2013, 11:34 AM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/large-bitcoin-exchangesattacks.
10 See Tim Allman, MtGox bitcoin exchange files for bankruptcy, BBC NEWS (Mar.
1, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-26394986/mtgox-bitcoin-exchangefiles-for-bankruptcy.
" Kim Zetter, FBI FearsBitcoin's Popularitywith Criminals, WIRED (May 9, 2012,
10:51 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/05/fbi-fears-bitcoin/.
1 Kristine Owram, Canada Moves to Regulate Crypto Trading Amid Quadriga
Scandal, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 14, 2019, 8:19 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-03-14/canada-moves-to-regulate-crypto-trading-amid-quadrigascandal.
" Id. (noting that "crypto assets with a value of almost $1 billion were stolen in 2018
from platforms around the world.").
14 Bitcoin Market Price, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/bitcoin (last
visited May 14, 2021).
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eclipsed any notion of crypto as a means of currency or barter. By mid-2019, a
widely held view was that less than 2 percent of all bitcoins were being used for
their originally intended purpose of facilitating trade without fiat currency.15
Thus, the growth of cryptocurrency has been hindered by theft, volatility, and
misuse. In this saga it is the transcendent significance of cryptocurrencies as a
means of investment that perhaps warrants the most legal scrutiny. Of course, it is
now axiomatic that bitcoin and other alt-currencies have since proven the most
appreciating asset in the world. 16 Whether constituting a means or an end,
cryptocurrency has grown to be unavoidable. Ironically, this omnipresent market
force still suffers from the frustration of both expert and neophyte as to what
cryptocurrency actually represents.
B.

The PersistentlyEvasive Definition

Despite its seeming omnipresence in America, cryptocurrency has
encountered myriad definitional hesitancies. The Treasury Department has never
declared bitcoin or similar creations the equivalent of fiat currencies (i.e., "legal
tender"), instead simply insisting that cash exchanges for cryptocurrencies satisfy
currency transaction requirements. " The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
issued guidance advising that profits on crypto-related investments should be
reported as gains on property 18 - adding that such "property" can be seized to
remedy taxpayer debts to the government.19 The IRS written guidance initially
spoke generally of such treatment under the tax laws 20 , while an update explained
the application of the same provisions to convertible securities and similar
instruments. 21

15

Olga Kharif, Bitcoin Rally Masks Uncomfortable Fact: Almost Nobody Uses It,

BLOOMBERG L. (May 31, 2019, 6:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-05-3 1/bitcoin-s-rally-masks-uncomfortable-fact-almost-nobody-uses-it.
16 As of April 30, 2021, Bitcoin-which underwent a type of "split" in 2017-was
valued at over $57,000 per coin, with approximately 18 million coins in worldwide
circulation; less than a month later, the price had dropped almost 30%. See Bitcoin Market
Price, supra note 14.
17 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S
REGULATIONS

TO

PERSONS

ADMINISTERING,

EXCHANGING,

OR

USING

VIRTUAL

CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013).
1 See infra notes 20 and
21.
19 Allyson Versprille, IRS Seizing Crypto Assets to Pay Off Tax Debts, Official Says,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 12, 2021, 8:54 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg
lawnews/daily-tax-report/X8AN4204000000?bna-newsfilter=daily-tax-report#jcite.
20 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938; I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36 (Mar.
25, 2014).
21 I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-167 (Oct. 9,
2019).
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Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an

enforcement arm of the Treasury Department, has twice issued guidance reminding
that parties "mining" bitcoins for others or exchanging bitcoins for cash must
comply with the registration requirements of the money laundering regulations
promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act. 22 To date, FinCEN has stopped short of
subjecting cryptocurrency transactions exceeding a monetary threshold in value to
reporting requirements.
While the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) rushed to fill a
void by obtaining judicial equating of cryptocurrency with commodities-via a
2015 disciplinary decision and subsequent court holding interpreting the
Commodity Futures Act of 2000-23 the relevant case decisions simply equate
virtual currency "with commodity interests;" 24 moreover, that agency has not
consistently litigated those holdings. 25
All of which raises the problematic query why precise definition has been
avoided in the fastest growing market of the 21t century.26 In sum, in the view of
American regulators, cryptocurrency is taxable property, but not an accepted
currency, and certainly nor a per se security. Although most often exemplified by
bitcoin, there are hundreds of alt-currencies dotting the global map. 27 Indeed,
attempt at legal definition of the cyberspace unit is largely an after-thought; bills
or disciplinary decisions centering on digital currency arrangements normally get
referenced in a footnote. 28 More pointed definition can be linked to esoteric source

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2019-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S
REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL
22

CURRENCIES (May 9, 2019).
23 In re TeraExchange, LLC, CFTC No. 15-33, 2015 WL 5658082 (Sept. 24, 2015);
see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (agreeing with the classification of bitcoin as a commodity).
24 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McDonnell, No. 18-CV-0361
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018).
25 The SEC acknowledged the CFTC determination in 2017. See infra notes
199-200.
26 See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Blockchain-BasedInitial Coin
Offerings Are All the Rage,
but the Legal Terrain is Uncertain, 104 A.B.A. J. 56 (Mar. 2018).
27 At least 200 virtual or cryptocurrencies are available for ready sale in both formal
and informal markets that operate online at all hours on all days. See All Cryptocurrencies,
COINMARKETCAP,

https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ (last visited May 10, 2021).

Viewers of the popular television program Saturday Night Live were reminded of
the lack of clarity underlying the crypto craze when, in a segment titled "Weekend Update,"
a pair of mock news anchors continually asked billionaire Elon Musk "But what IS
Dogecoin?" Saturday Night Live: Weekend Update (NBC television broadcast May 8,
2021). The billionaire, playing an economist in the satirical skit, ultimately offered, "It can
be exchanged for cash," as well as "Yes, it's a hustle." Id. Without humor, the 24-hour
28
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and complicated result. 29
Further, the ledger for cryptocurrency, "blockchain," is tautologically defined
by the presence of cryptocurrency. For example, The National Conference of State
Legislatures has declared simply that all digital currency transactions are recorded
in a blockchain. 30 Separately, neither technocrats" nor foreign regulators have
gone any further in clarifying the nature of the beast, no matter how large it
grows.32

online market reacted immediately: The price of the dubious crypto currency fell
considerably. See MacKenzie Sigalos, Dogecoin PlungesNearly 30% DuringElon Musk's
SNL Appearance, CNBC: CRYPTO DECODED (May 9, 2021, 1:49 AM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/08/dogecoin-price-plummets-as-elon-musk-hostssaturday-night-live-.html.
29 On at least one occasion, "virtual currency" has been verbosely defined as:
[A] digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and
functions as: (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account;
and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e.,
when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any
jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils
the above functions only by agreement within the community of users of
the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat currency
(a.k.a. "real currency," "real money," or "national currency"), which is
the coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal
tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of
exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money, which is a
digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer
value denominated in fiat currency.
Financial Action Task Force [FATF], Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential
AML/CFT Risks, at 4 (June 27, 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents
/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. In contrast, an
initial coin offering, or "ICO" (discussed later herein), is defined by the SEC as "a
fundraising event in which an entity offers participants a unique coin or 'token' issued on
a 'blockchain' or consideration (often in the form of digital assets or fiat currency)".
Complaint at 7, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Middleton, No. 19-CV-04625 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
12, 2019).
" Heather Morton,

Cryptocurrency 2018 Legislation, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE

(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-andcommerce/cryptocurrency-2018-legislation.aspx.
3 Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Security Laws?, 18 J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 99 (2014).
32 See, e.g., Monami Yui & Takahiko Hyuga, Japan Says Bitcoin Not CurrencyAmid
Calls for Regulation, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:13 PM EST), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-07/j apan-says-bitcoin-is-not-a-currency-amidcalls-for-regulation.
LEGISLATURES
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The Leviathan Market Presence

As of January 2021, there are over 4,000 identified cryptocurrencies
worldwide. 3 In the spring of this year, the cryptocurrency market reached a
plateau market capitalization of $2 trillion." While a finite list of American
companies accept bitcoin as a payment option, the alt-currency is as ubiquitous as
it is complex. Correspondingly, the "victims" of the phenomena have mounted as
the public's desire for it swells."
Overall, the peer-to-peer system imagined by Nakomoto could hardly be said
to have welcomed regulation. 36 Indeed, the fundamentals of such idyllic
economies eschew any form of government intervention.37 Yet, the popularity of
cryptocurrency, its lack of finite definition, its volatile pricing, and its potential for
fraud collectively called for (and continue to call for) government oversight.
Against such backdrop, the world's foremost business regulator, namely, the SEC,
would find remaining dormant impossible. While Commission involvement may
have been inevitable, the agency's successful application of an elastic measure
continues to warrant admiration. Such laurels are inspired by a body of law more
often comprehensible in view of its history than its exact verbiage.
Accordingly, Part II of this Article provides background on the definition of
"security" as introduced by the federal securities laws, examining both the counterintuitive growth of the threshold test and its impressive application by the SEC and
private litigants to cryptocurrency arrangements. Next, Part III brings a tighter lens
to the cases brought by the Commission for the purpose of juxtaposing the recent
"Token" proposals offered by an SEC Commissioner. Part III concludes by
offering amendments to the bold proposal in the areas of the suggested exemption,
the attending definitions, the putative disclosures, and the reconciliation with both
exemption law and Commission pronouncements to date. Part IV ends the Article
with reminders on the need for prompt SEC rulemaking.

33

Luke Conway, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoin,

(Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/most-importantcryptocurrencies-other-than-bitcoin/.
" Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Crypto Market Cap Surges to Record $2 Trillion,
Bitcoin at $1.1 Trillion, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2021, 9:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us -crypto-currency-marketcap/crypto-market-cap-surges-to-record-2-trillionbitcoin-at-1-1-trillion-idUSKBN2BS 117.
35 Caitlin Ostroff, New York Attorney General Warns on Cryptocurrencyas Bitcoin
Rallies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2021, 12:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkattorney-general-warns-on-cryptocurrencies-as-bitcoin-rallies-11614618921 ("The state's
top law-enforcement official said bitcoin's price rise has lured more bad actors.").
36 See generally Nakomoto, supra note 1.
3 Id.
INVESTOPEDIA
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II. BACKGROUND: FROM ORANGE TREES TO DIGITAL TOKENS
A.

Statutory Response to The GreatDepression

The federal securities laws of 1933 and 1934 were an intense legislative
reaction to a decade of Wall Street folly that almost bankrupted a nation. In the
main, State-based common law fraud had proven to be a poor match for the
pervasive recklessness that had grown among brokerages, investment banks, and
stock exchanges; in turn, the companies touted by these intermediaries more often
than not chose hyperbole (or outright lies) over fact in luring investors to the
purchase.38 President Roosevelt and Congress were eager to restore investor
confidence and reacted to profligate speculation by creating remedial laws with
true market impact. 39 The primary purpose of these laws could be said to be
ensuring investor protection through mandatory disclosure before the transaction
and elastic reach of anti-fraud provisions afterwards. If the Acts themselves were
to be "sold" to all interested parties as a rational alternative (i.e., mandatory
registration and disclosure), then the question of covered activity would
nonetheless be broad.
The first of these laws, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), is known
as the "truth in securities" law. 40 Neither the 1933 Act nor the ensuing Securities
38 See generally MICHAEL A. PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: How

FERDINAND

PECORA'S INVESTIGATION

OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED

AMERICAN FINANCE (2011) (detailing the congressional "Pecora Hearings" and their
success in revealing the depth of issuer fraud in the 1920s).
39 Promptly after his first inauguration, President Roosevelt began to push for
securities reform, primarily based upon the wish of meaningful written issuer disclosures
to investors. In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, President Roosevelt said:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained
or that the properties which they represent will earn profit. There is,
however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity
and information, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933). Even before FDR worked to repeal Prohibition and
reward voters with a drink of alcohol, he worked to revamp the oversight of the stock
exchanges. See J. SCOTT COLESANTI, FAIRNESS, INC.: THE ORIGINS (AND BILLIONDOLLAR BONUSES) OF RULE 10B-5 AS AMERICA'S INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION 4

(2018) [hereinafter FAIRNESS, INC.].
4 The 1933 Securities Act, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com
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Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"; collectively, "the Acts") were intended to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud. 41 Instead, these statutes apply only to
those investments that are within their broad statutory definition of a "security." 4 2
Stated more formally, the purpose of the federal securities statutes is "compelling
full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."' 43
The protocol built by the New Dealers has grown to be the envy of regulators
everywhere. Issuers are compelled to register securities or methodically adhere to
demanding "exemptions" from registration authorized by statute. In turn, stock
exchanges trading securities must register and submit to the SEC the rules that
govern their operations and rulemaking; to this same end, investment advisers (of
a certain size) recommending securities must register with the Commission. And,
of course, broker-dealers need to register on various levels including the SEC, the
states wherein business is sought or conducted, and the largest self-regulatory
organization, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA 44). Penalties for
avoiding registration range from fines to criminal incarceration of controlling

/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/1933-securities-act-truth-securities/

(last visited

&

Nov. 6, 2021); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124
n.10 (1953).
41 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); see also Northland Cap.
Corp. v. Silver, 735 F.2d 1421, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Baurer v. Plan. Grp., Inc., 669 F.2d
770, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10) (providing a detailed list of categories and
examples of "securities," including catchall language such as "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security"').
43 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,299 (1946) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933)); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding that the primary purpose of the federal securities
laws is to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor").
Moreover, "[o]ne of [the 1934 Act's] central purposes is to protect investors through the
requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities .... " Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967). Thus, the design of the statute was to "protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions." Sec.
Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost & Co.
v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941)). "[T]he Court repeatedly has
described the 'fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full
disclosure . . . ."' Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78
(1977) (quoting Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 186).
44 Created in 2007, FINRA combined the Divisions of Enforcement of its
predecessor, NASD, and the New York Stock Exchange. See The Institutionof Experience:
Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-2010, SEC HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.SEChistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro06g.php (last visited May 12,
2021).
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individuals. 45
In turn, as primary enforcer of the most expansive system of securities
statutes, the SEC has nearly 100 years of experience in enforcing the Acts. Both
statutes bestow jurisdiction among federal courts to hear cases imposing
disciplinary action far exceeding traditional European and state notions of business
regulation. Both Acts also operate around the jurisdictional lynchpin of the
presence of a security. As is demonstrated below, the federal courts have been
unflagging allies in expanding that pivotal notion in the cause of punishing investor
abuse. This consistent judicial animation of the New Deal spirit is best exemplified
by the willingness to identify promoters and investors in arrangements varying
wildly from the traditional notion of a corporate share certificate.
B.

The Threshold Question ofLocating a "Security"

From its inception, Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 has contained
a veritable laundry list of arrangements defining "securities." In its current form,
the statutory definition of a "security" reads as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing. 46
A similarly broad and inclusive list exists in Section 3 of the 1934 Act. The

" See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 783 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding
conviction of an issuer found to have avoided registration).
46 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
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courts have equated the two Acts in this regard. 47 Consequentially, the existence
of a security far surpasses shares traded on a stock exchange or even deals carefully
crafted to exclude either the coverage of the securities laws or the moniker of
"stock." Further, once satisfying the jurisdictional nexus of locating a security (i.e.,
identifying a security in the transaction, as required by statutes and/or regulations
requiring registration), the SEC can charge entities as acting as unregistered
broker-dealers, investment advisers, or stock exchanges. 48
Remarkably, the dual laundry lists within the Act have served primarily as
academic starting points for further application. While it is accepted that Congress
had tried to craft a broad definition that would "meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise
of profits," 49 the federal legislature failed to define the catch-all phrase "investment
contract." 50 The resulting common law standard results in case-by-case
determinations of the threshold question to any dispute. And the Supreme Court
availed itself of that flexibility, aggrandizing jurisdiction in crafting a case law test
that has come to be known as the "Howey Test." That test spurs a case-by-case
determination utilizing a 4-part, conjunctive analysis created by the Supreme Court
in the eponymous case. In sum, the test seeks to identify passive investors, while
- owing to the later Tcherepnin case - discerning the "economic realities of the
transaction."

While there had been prior occasion for the High Court case to interpret the
definition of "investment contract" in the 1933 Act,52 the Howey decision of 1946

&

" In Tcherepnin, the Supreme Court held that the statutory term "security" has the
same flexible meaning under both the Acts. 389 U.S. at 338 ("As used in both the 1933
and 1934 Acts, security 'embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."'). However, SEC charges
often reference both Acts.
48 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. McFarland, No. 18-CV-6634 (S.D.N.Y. July
24, 2018); Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018).
49 "Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called." Reves v. Ernst
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
51 "Throughout the history of struggling for an appropriate definition, courts have
been mindful of the fact that the bottom-line question is whether the particular investment
or instrument involved is one that needs or demands the investor protection of the federal
(or state) securities laws." THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
30-31 (3d ed. 1996).
51 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1967).
52 E.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 n.6
(1943) (finding the offer and sale of assignments in oil leases, coupled with the promoter's
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offered clearer guidance for review of novel arrangements. In a decision weighing
the sale of orange tree lots when coupled with efforts of the promoter to monetize,
the Supreme Court found the creative arrangement to satisfy Section 2(1) of the
1933 Act. As the Court stated, the test "permits the fulfillment of the statutory
purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many
types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept
of a security."'5 3
The 4-part conjunctive test created by the Supreme Court in the landmark
Howey case is strikingly friendly to parties asserting the presence of a security.
The standard seeks to identify passive investors (i.e., those who rely solely on
others for profits). In turn, promoters satisfy the test regardless of intent, for Howey
instructed that a security could result even from a "bona fide" belief that the
securities laws did not apply. 54
Consequentially, the list of investment contract arrangements has grown
almost without pause. Indeed, in the past 40 years, case law has expanded the
application of securities laws to business models such as franchises 5 and
unsecured promissory notes. 56 Moreover, the intent of the parties to expressly
include or exclude exempted transactions within the securities laws is irrelevant,
as demonstrated by GreatRivers Coop. v. FarmlandsIndus.57 and United States v.

Leonard.58
Thus, the SEC has chilled quixotic offers of profitable investment by labeling
"promoter" and "investor" to expand its reach in widely disparate areas. Some
notable examples include condominium subletting agreements 59 animal breeding

promise to drill test wells, constitute investment contracts, reasoning that section 2(1)
expressly references "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights").

H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933).
54 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
53

55 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 878
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
56 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Thompson, 732 F.3d 1151, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013).
57 Great Rivers Co-op of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 699 (8th
Cir. 1999). The Great Rivers court stated that the promoter's state registration of the
arrangement was a nullity in its determination.
58 United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008). The Leonard court expressly
discounted the defendant's classification of the arrangement as being subject solely to New
York's Limited Liability Company statute.
59 Bamert v. Pulte Home Corp., 445 F. App'x 256 (11th Cir. 2011).

14

CORP. & Bus. L.J.

Vol. 3:1: 2022

farms,60 "death bonds,"61 and internet-gaming coins. 62
In view of the successful expansion of SEC application of Section 5 and the
concomitant universal application of Rule lOb-5 as an anti-fraud remedy, 63 the fact
that the SEC would take on the challenge of protecting American "investors" in
alt-currencies is unsurprising. Better fitting still is the application of the Acts to a
popular spinoff of the bitcoin craze, the initial coin offering (ICO). 64 An "initial
coin offering" or "ICO" is a recently developed form of fundraising event in which
an entity offers participants a unique digital "coin" or "token" in exchange for
consideration (most commonly Bitcoin, Ether, or fiat currency). In such lucrative
ventures, fledgling companies with grandiose plans exchange future "tokens" in a
unique digital enterprise. The company raising capital (i.e., the "Promoter") asserts
that sales of such tokens are necessary to gather network participants, while the
regulator fears that the tokens - going beyond any "utility" - are commensurate
with issuing stock that may appreciate in value. Because many investor-purchasers
actually part with money, ICOs consistently state plausible cases for securities law
coverage, particularly in light of the great many federal courts rewarding

Sheets v. Dziabis, 738 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In the
infamous SEC loss, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the fractionalized interests in transferred life
insurance policies (called "viatical settlements"), being reliant upon the life expectancy of
the terminally ill, failed to satisfy the "efforts of others" element of Howey. That holding
was later contravened by other courts, most notably the high court of Texas in Life
Partners,Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015). The Texas decision evidences the
state court reliance on Howey:
60
61

We hold that the agreements at issue are investment contracts because
they constitute transactions through which a person pays money to
participate in a common enterprise with the expectation of receiving
profits, under circumstances in which the failure or success of the
enterprise and the person's realization of the expected profits is at least
predominately due to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.
Id. at 662.
62 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
63 Since its inception, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act has outlawed securities
fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934). Since 1942, enabling SEC Rule 10b-5 has outlawed three
alternative genres thereof: scheme liability [subsection "a"], misstatement liability
[subsection "b"], practice/course of business liability [subsection "c"]. 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5. The rule can be invoked by government and private litigants alike and has been
successfully applied countless times to individuals, corporations, government subdivisions,
and foreign entities. See generally FAIRNESS, INC., supra note 39, at 3-60.
64 For purposes of this article, cryptocurrency and ICOs are equated as digital assets.
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expansion in favor of investor protection. 65 Such scrutiny by the courts is rarely a
stretch; often, tokens are listed by third parties and tradeable immediately after
they are issued. 66
To be sure, the SEC's application of the Howey test to crypto arrangements
goes beyond ICOs. However, ICO offerings appear to have garnered the most
attention from the Commission. And that attention is rewarded when the orange
grove case from 1946 is successfully applied.
C.

The Howey Test

For the vast majority of jurisdictional inquiries, the Howey test fleshes out
what constitutes an 'investment contract" for purposes of the federal securities
laws. 67 The term had no standard meaning in any commercial context, although it
appeared in a number of states' "Blue Sky laws" before the 1933 Act. 68 In
layman's terms, the test seeks to identify transactions in which investors are relying
on others to manage the enterprise that will produce financial returns on their
investments. 69 These investors often lack the expertise of the promoters behind the
arrangement. The test, thus, identifies those deals warranting registration under the
Acts, which required formal disclosures about the deal and the issuer.

&

65 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393
(2004)
("'Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.' Reves v. Ernst
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990). To that end, it enacted a broad definition of 'security,'
sufficient 'to encompass virtually any instruments that might be sold as an investment.'
Ibid.").
66 Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 2017 WL 10605969 (Dec. 11,
2017) [hereinafter Munchee Order].
67 It is commonly accepted that the Howey decision began a period of the SEC brashly
applying the Acts to nonconventional securities-an ever-growing list of investments the
First Circuit has described as "a kaleidoscopic assortment of pecuniary arrangements that
defy categorization." SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 47 (denying defendants' motion to dismiss). This
expansive reading of the statute is buttressed by court decisions noting the lack of other
regulatory remedies-the Supreme Court has even expressly tilted the scales in favor of
finding a security when the instruments in question "would escape federal regulation
entirely if the [Securities] Acts were held not to apply." Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. at 67-69
(finding farm cooperative demand notes to be securities after analysis under the Second
Circuit's "family resemblance" test, used to identify commercial paper). See also FAIRNESS,
INC., supra note 39, at 27-28.
68 See Leslie J. Crocker, Investment Contracts under Federal and State Law, 17 W.
RSRV. L. REV. 1108, 1111 (1966).
69 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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The Test in Parts

The Howey test is typically described as having four elements. The first
element requires an investment of money. 70 Courts have held that cash is not the
only form of contribution or investment that will satisfy this prong.71 This prong
has been interpreted to include cash, promissory notes, 72 and bartered-for goods
and services. 73 The investment of money element is met when an investor parts
with consideration "with the hope of some future return." 74 And as one
commentator has aptly noted, "[i]t appears that any nuanced reading of the first
element is subsumed in subsequent [t]est factors."75
The second element requires that the investment of money be in a "common
enterprise."76 The Supreme Court in Howey made a showing of fact to support a
finding of commonality but failed to define the contours of this required
commonality, leaving it to the lower courts to flesh out. 77 Two sub-tests have
developed to satisfy the requirement of commonality. First, this element can be
satisfied through "horizontal commonality," which focuses on the connection
between and among the investors (i.e., looking for investors sharing the risk of the
enterprise by sharing profits and losses proportionately).
The alternate approach to the second element taken by some circuits is known

70

Id. at 301.

Uselton v. Com. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991).
72 Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976).
73 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 552 n.12 (1979). But see United
States v. Jones, 450 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding airline ticket vouchers not to be
securities for purposes the prohibition against carriage of forged instruments set out in 18
U.S.C. § 2311, even where such provision-which largely echoed the 1933 Act and 1934
definitional sections-specifically included "evidence of indebtedness").
71

74 See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS (4th ed.

2003), reprinted in LARRY D. SODERQUIST, Reach of Securities Act Regulation in
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: NUTS & BOLTS OF

SECURITIES LAWS 113, 119 (Practising Law Institute 2005); Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
?5 J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How the S.E.C. Can Handle
Bitcoin's Threat to American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 32 (2015).
76 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
?? Christopher L. Borsani, A "Common" Problem: Examining the Needfor Common
Ground in the "Common Enterprise"Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 4
(2008); see also Jonathan E. Shook, Note, The Common Enterprise Test: Getting
Horizontalor Going Vertical in Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 30 TULSA L.J. 727, 732-33
(1995) ("Unfortunately, because neither the Court in Howey nor any subsequent Supreme
Court decision has defined the 'common enterprise' prong of the Howey test, the federal
courts have been left to disagree.") (citing Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What is a
Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract

Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 325 (1989).
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as "vertical commonality," which focuses on the connection between the promoter
and investors, looking for "the fortunes of the investor interwoven with and
dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties."78
The third element requires that investment be undertaken with the expectation
of profits. 79 This expectation cannot be of additional contributions, and the return
on investment must be the principal motivation for the investment. 80 This element
is often synonymous with the marketing of the financial arrangements particular
to the given investment and is often demonstrated by a "[p]romoter's wistful
statements or advertising of successful commercial activities." 81
Finally, the fourth element requires that the profits result from the efforts of
others. 82 This element has seen significant movement since Howey was decided.
The original language in Howey required that the investment of money in this
common enterprise be undertaken with the expectation of profits solely from the
efforts of others. 83 Excluding where an investor provided any efforts would
exclude from the protection of the securities laws any investment that involved
even the most minimal effort from the investors.8 4 In a pair of victories against a
notorious Ponzi schemer in the 1970s, the SEC succeeded in amending the test so
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1973). The subsequent variation of element two can be summarized as follows:
78

[V]ertical commonality was juridically divided into strict and broad
varieties, enthusiastically embraced by litigants and opportunistically
utilized by the SEC. "Strict" vertical commonality requires that the
economic fates of the Promoter and Investor be tied and that their
fortunes rise and fall together, the focus rests upon a closely-aligned
"one-to-one relationship between the investor and investment manager."
Conversely, "broad" vertical commonality requires only that the
"efforts" of Promoter and Investor be "linked." The Supreme Court has
not determined which, if any, of the versions is universally required.

&

Colesanti, supra note 75, at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
79 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
80 Some courts combine the third and fourth components, and thus refer to the test as
a three-part test. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Sec.
Exch. Comm'n v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)) ("We distilled Howey's
definition into a three-part test .... "). This combination is supportable, as the full idea is
that the investor has an expectation of profit and that expectation must come, to a large
measure, from the efforts of someone other than the investor.
" Colesanti, supra note 75, at 34-35.
82 Sec. & Exch. Comm'nv. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
83 Id.
84

Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003).
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that only "essential" or "managerial" promoter efforts be located. 85
Overall, the Howey test, for better or for worse, is what courts and investors
are left with to determine whether a given opportunity is an investment contract
and, thus, within the reach of the Acts, specifically the registration and prospectus
delivery requirements of Section 5. As was noted:
Despite some hiccups, Howey transformed the 1933 Act and 1934
Act into dynamic statutes that would forever value the dual
promises of Section 5 (i.e., registration and prospectus delivery 86).
Moreover, the federal bench has continued to uphold Howey's
promise of protection for investors in securities traditional or
otherwise; such continued protection is laudable for, among other
reasons, the vulnerability and political nature of agency-made law
in general. 87
(ii)

Application to CryptocurrencyArrangements

The SEC has not been shy about using the Howey test to attempt to rein in
"the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits." 88 While cryptocurrency itself has never
been declared a security by a court or the Commission, the world of cryptocurrency
arrangements is fertile ground for SEC intervention. Commentators have debated
whether and how cryptocurrencies should be regulated, with the debate clearly
illustrating that any path to regulation was not self-evident from the language of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 89 Under certain circumstances, the SEC has declared that
both vehicles purchasing cryptocurrency and ICOs themselves constitute sales of
securities warranting formal registration with the agency (and the filing of related
public disclosures). 90
In the seminal SEC action, SEC v. Shavers, the SEC asserted that a fund

85 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir.
1974).
86 15 U.S.C. § 77f (a), (c).
87 FAIRNESS, INC., supra note 39; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 328-29 (2d. ed. 2006); WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw 54-57 (6th ed. 2012) (noting that the federal agencies' "administrator[s are] totally
subject to Presidential control").
88 Sec. & Exch. Comm'nv. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
89 See FAIRNESS, INC., supra note 39 (calling for more active SEC regulation of
Bitcoin). For a broader, generalized call for regulatory action, see Yang, supra note 31, at
114-15 (concluding that any sale of bitcoin itself satisfies all prongs of the Howey test).
90 See, e.g., Munchee Order, supra note 66, at *8.
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designed to trade bitcoin constituted an investment contract under Howey.91
Shavers, the founder and operator of "Bitcoin Savings & Trust" (BTCST), solicited
lenders to invest in bitcoin-related opportunities. 92 Shavers challenged the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the BTCST investments were not
securities because bitcoin is not "money." 93
The court agreed with the Commission, finding that the BTCST investments
were ripe for application because bitcoin could be used as money to purchase
goods and services and could be exchanged for "conventional" currencies.
Accordingly, the court found that "Bitcoin is a currency or form of money, and
investors wishing to invest in BTCST provided an investment of money."
Subsequent SEC cases would be more instructive. The Commission enjoyed
a string of uninterrupted victories clawing back monies for investors or swelling
government coffers with fines. Indeed, the Howey test elements of "money" and
"profits" (i.e., elements 1 and 3) posed nearly no obstacle to application. Investors
in startups willingly trade consideration and consistently show a desire for profit.
Thus, the challenge for the SEC lies in the "common enterprise" and "efforts of
others" requirements (i.e., elements 2 and 4, respectively).
In the Telegram Group case, 95 the SEC set forth its position that, beyond
essential managerial efforts by promoters (i.e., element 4), the absence of any
required investor efforts to create profits sufficed. Thus, in alleging that "the
principal means by which investors would reasonably expect to profit is through
their resale of [tokens],"96 the SEC obviated the need to allege or prove that the
promoter issuer actively encourages a third-party market. The case resulted in the
successful halting of an offering by a foreign-based mobile messengering
application determined to be tied to the "world's most adopted cryptocurrency
wallet." 97
A year later, in the Ackerman case, the SEC halted an offering by a physician
who had secured $33 million in an advertised effort to "pool money to invest in
cryptocurrencies." 98 The SEC alleged that the physician diverted millions of
91 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) aff'd on reh'g on other grounds, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL
4652121 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014).
92 Id. at *1.
93

Id.

94 Id. at *2.
95 Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 CIV. 9439 (PKC),
2020 WL 61528 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019).
96
Id. at 198.
97
Id. at¶ 103.
98 Complaint at 1 3, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ackerman, No. 1:20-CV-1181
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020).
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dollars of such contributions for personal use. In alleging the presence of a security,
the SEC complaint alleged that the defendant falsely claimed that his controlled
entities "successfully traded various crypto currencies through various crypto
exchanges using proprietary algorithmically driven software for other pooled
investment groups." 99
A scrutiny of a broader selection of crypto cases likewise reveals that to raise
the question of a security's presence is largely to answer it in the affirmative.100
Many other cases would successfully apply Howey to coin offerings. Those
disciplinary proceedings would benefit from loud declarations of support from the
SEC Chair and others.
D.

SEC Public Pronouncements of Note

Curiously, while avoiding formal rulemaking, between 2017 and 2020, the
Commission often publicized a confident view that crypto arrangements fell within
the securities laws. In the oft-discussed 2017 DAO report, the SEC, while deciding
against enforcement action, declared that Slock.it, a German cyberspace
corporation holding "a corpus of assets through the sale of DAO Tokens to
investors" had sold securities under American laws.101 "Slock.it" had sold over 1
billion DAO Tokens in less than a month in the spring of 2016.102 The SEC did not
bring an enforcement action against the startup because a hacker stole
approximately one-third of the digital asset organization's assets after the DAO
Tokens were sold but before it was able to begin financing the project. 103
In applying the Howey test to DAO Tokens, the SEC first concluded that the
investors in DAO Tokens did invest money, although no traditional currency
changed hands.t" Specifically, the SEC found that investors in DAO Tokens used
Ether (ETH), a virtual currency used on a decentralized platform that runs smart
contracts known as the Ethereum Blockchain to make their investments. Each
investor tendered ETH in exchange for DAO Tokens. Despite the lack of
traditional currency to satisfy the "investment of money" prong of Howey, the SEC
99

Id. at ¶33.
See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
101 See generally, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017)
[hereinafter DAO Report], https://www.SEC.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
102 Id. at 2-3. The DAO's intended purpose was to "blaze a new path in business for
the betterment of its members, existing simultaneously nowhere and everywhere and
operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code." Id. at 5.
'03 Id. at 1.
104 Id. at 11 (citing Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564,
574 (10th Cir. 1991)).
100
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concluded that the investment in DAO Tokens "is the type of contribution of value
that can create an investment contract under Howey." 105
Next, the SEC combined discussion of the commonality prong of the Howey
test with the DAO Tokens in its discussion of the "reasonable expectation of
profits" prong of the Howey test. The only reference to the commonality
requirement is the SEC's unsupported conclusion that DAO Token investors were
invested in a common enterprise. 106
The SEC devoted more analysis to the expectation of profits prong and noted
that for purposes of the Howey test, profits can include "dividends, other periodic
payments, or the increased value of the investment." 107 A profit-seeking enterprise,
the DAO's objectives included funding projects in exchange for a return on
investment.108 Since DAO Token holders had the possibility of sharing in potential
profits from the various contracts funded, the SEC concluded that "a reasonable
investor would have been motivated, at least in part, by the prospects of profits on
their investment of ETH in The DAO."109
The final prong of the Howey test (i.e., that the profits be derived from the
managerial efforts of others) was met with the DAO Tokens. Namely, since the
investors "relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of Slock.it and its
co-founders" (e.g., generating project proposals), there existed the requisite
reliance upon the promoters. 10
Finally, the SEC made it clear that the federal securities laws apply to any
and all investments that fall within the statutory definition:
The registration requirements are designed to provide investors
with procedural protections and material information necessary to
make informed investment decisions. These requirements apply to
those who offer and sell securities in the United States, regardless
whether the issuing entity is a traditional company or a
decentralized autonomous organization, regardless whether those
105 Id. (first citing Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014
WL
4652121, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014); and then citing Uselton, 940 F.2d at 574 ("[T]he
'investment' may take the form of 'goods and services,' or some other 'exchange of
value. "')).
1 06
Id.
107 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394
(2004).
10' DAO Report, supra note 101, at 11-12.

109 Id.
1 10
Id. at 12. The SEC was not troubled by the DAO Token holders' voting rights,
finding that these rights "did not provide them with meaningful control over the enterprise,
because (1) DAO Token holders' ability to vote for contracts was a largely perfunctory
one; and (2) DAO Token holders were widely dispersed and limited in their ability to
communicate with one another." Id. at 14.
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securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies,
and regardless whether they are distributed in certificated form or
through distributed ledger technology.'
The clear precedent became an injunction action not much later. In late 2017,
the SEC halted an entrepreneurial offering commenced by Munchee, Inc. 112
Munchee, a California corporation with a deal with Apple, issued digital coins to
budding restaurant critics for submitting a review of a local eatery. 13 The
Commission halted the offering on day two of its operation, which had been slated
to earn $15 million from American purchasers. 14 The accompanying SEC
settlement order quoted a case from an earlier generation weighing cooperative
apartment shares as securities, United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman."5 The
order stated:
The "touchstone" of an investment contract "is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others." This definition embodies a "flexible
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." 1 6
Also, in late 2017, the SEC Chair issued a warning to all potential ICO issuers that
the securities laws would presumably apply to their deals:
A key question for all ICO market participants: "Is the coin or
token a security?" As securities law practitioners know well, the
answer depends on the facts. For example, a token that represents
a participation interest in a book-of-the-month club may not
implicate our securities laws, and may well be an efficient way for
the club's operators to fund the future acquisition of books and
facilitate the distribution of those books to token holders. In
contrast, many token offerings appear to have gone beyond this
construct and are more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built
publishing house with the authors, books and distribution
networks all to come. It is especially troubling when the

1"
112

Id. at 18.
Munchee Order, supra note 66.

113

Id.

114 Id.

United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Munchee Order, supra note 66, at 8 (first quoting United Hous. Found., Inc., 421
U.S. at 852-53, then quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946)).
115

1 16
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promoters of these offerings emphasize the secondary market
trading potential of these tokens. Prospective purchasers are
being sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value - with
the ability to lock in those increases by reselling the tokens on a
secondary market - or to otherwise profit from the tokens based
on the efforts of others. These are key hallmarks of a security and
a securities offering.1 1 7

The Chair's warning to investment professionals concurrently acknowledged a
presumption that related parties would, where appropriate, be subject to the
securities laws:
I also caution market participants against promoting or touting the
offer and sale of coins without first determining whether the
securities laws apply to those actions. Selling securities generally
requires a license, and experience shows that excessive touting in
thinly traded and volatile markets can be an indicator of
"scalping," "pump and dump" and other manipulations and
frauds. Similarly, I also caution those who operate systems and
platforms that effect or facilitate transactions in these products that
they may be operating unregistered exchanges or broker-dealers
that are in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(emphasis in original). 18
This fire and brimstone approach resonates when a schemer is the target, much less
so when a business seeks to sell digital coins for use on its network (i.e., "utility
tokens"). To the extent the weight of the Commission's vaunted Division of
Enforcement was not readily comprehended, the Chair continued:
On cryptocurrencies, I want to emphasize two points. First, while
there are cryptocurrencies that do not appear to be securities,
simply calling something a "currency" or a currency-based
product does not mean that it is not a security. Before launching
a cryptocurrency or a product with its value tied to one or more
cryptocurrencies, its promoters must either (1) be able to
demonstrate that the currency or product is not a security or (2)
comply with applicable registration and other requirements under
our securities laws. 11 9

117 Jay Clayton, Chairman, Statement on Cryptocurrencies
and Initial Coin Offerings,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.SEC.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
118 Id. (emphasis in original).
119 Id.
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Further, the SEC's admonitions were effectively spread to third parties.
Approximately a year after the Munchee Order and the Chair's warnings, the
Commission made good on its advertised presumption that coins issued via ICOs
are securities. Significantly, in accepting $900,000 to promote three ICOs on his
Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook accounts, champion boxer Floyd Mayweather
was found to have violated Section 17b of the Securities Act. 120 In a much
publicized settlement with the boxer, the SEC imposed discipline upon
Mayweather - an ordinary citizen, not a securities professional - for his paid
endorsement of digital tokens. That SEC Order tersely held, "Mayweather violated
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act by touting three ICOs that involved the offer
and sale of securities on his social media accounts without disclosing that he
received compensation from an issuer for doing so, or the amount of the
consideration." 121
The SEC Order naming Mayweather did not explain the application of
Section 5 or the Howey test to the ICOs in issue. 122 The conclusion seems to be
presumed, as it was in a companion settlement Order concluded with celebrity DJ
Khaled. 123 Mayweather consented to pay $600,000 in satisfaction of a fine and
disgorgement, as well as the undertaking to refrain from further violations12 4 and
Khaled agreed, for a two-year period, to:
Forgo receiving or agreeing to receive any form of compensation
or consideration, directly or indirectly, from any issuer,
underwriter, or dealer, for directly or indirectly publishing, giving
publicity to, or circulating any notice, circular, advertisement,
newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication
which, though not purporting to offer a Security, digital or
otherwise, for sale, describes such Security. 125
The rush to apply the Acts without definitive classification of the underlying

120 See generally Floyd Mayweather Jr., Securities Act Release No. 10578, 2018 WL
6266203 at 2 (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Mayweather Order].
121 Id.
122 Id. at 6.
123 Khaled Khaled, Securities Act Release No. 10579,
2018 WL 6266204 (Nov. 29,
2018) 124
[hereinafter Khaled Order].
Mayweather Order, supra note 120, at 4.
125 Khaled Order, supra note 123, at 3. Of note is the SEC No Action Letter
of early
April 2019, which permitted an ICO to move forward without registration of tokens
representing air charter discounts where the issuer, among other things, did not emphasize
the "potential for increase in the market value of the Token" and the Token was limited to
an immovable price of $1. See TurnKey Jet, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 WL
1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019); see also Turnkey Jet, Inc., infra notes 218-19.
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product may have reached an illogical extreme in 2018. In Zaslavskiy, a federal
court upheld a DOJ indictment while simply deferring the application of the Howey
test for the finder of fact. 126
Thus, for several years, the SEC, in word and deed, expanded the scope of
the securities laws to include ICOs. The Commission now benefits from precedents
in the form of SEC administrative Orders and federal court decisions, as well as a
wealth of related case law expanding the application of the Howey test for over 70
years.
Moreover, a further advantage to SEC involvement in regulating a novel field
is the attendant and inevitable civil class actions that ensue. Such actions by
supplemental enforcers of the securities laws are described below.
E.

Class Action Litigation and State Authorities

Private class actions seeking a return of investments in blockchain and altcurrency abound, even though the grounds for such broad SEC interpretation of
relevant definitions and anti-fraud prohibitions are vulnerable. A review of private
cases from New York and California demonstrates the application of the Howey
test to ICOs to facilitate class action lawsuits brought by investors in failed
companies that had promoted using blockchain in conjunction with a new
cryptocurrency.
In the 2018 case of Coffey v. Ripple Labs, the plaintiff alleged a "neverending
ICO" that would result in the issuer inevitably controlling 80 percent of the
available digital coins. The complaint alleged that the defendant's admission to
seeking investments in coins to fund "its operation and its network" suffices as
satisfying the common enterprise element of the Howey test, while the admitted
reliance on the defendant's expertise satisfies element 4 (i.e., "efforts of others").
The private suit has survived motions to dismiss and is pending in California
federal court, while a high-profile related SEC action against Ripple Labs
continues.127

More pointedly, in the 2019 case of Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, 128 a class
action was brought forth against an issuer and two of its founders for a violation
126

Jean-Jacques Cabou & Todd Kerr, Perkins Coie LLP, Federal District Court

Upholds Securities Indictmentfor ICOs but Defers Final Howey Determination in United

States v. Zaslavskiy, JDSUPRA (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
federal-district-court-upholds-43110/ (discussing United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR4346339 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018)).
127 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Ripple and Two
Executives with Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec. 22, 2020),

https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-338.
128

Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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of the '33 Act by selling unregistered securities through an ICO. ATBCOIN was a
technology-based start-up, the purpose of which was to facilitate rapid and lowcost digital financial transactions leveraging blockchain technology. In denying
the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court found all four of the elements of the
Howey test satisfied.
Specifically, between June 12, 2017, and September 15, 2017, ATBCOIN
conducted an ICO and promised to launch a resulting ATB blockchain. By the end
of the ICO, ATBCOIN raised over $20 million from thousands of investors, but
the promised blockchain had not materialized. Within a year, Balestra's coins had
dropped in value by more than 85 percent from the purchase price.
ATBCOIN did not file a registration statement at any point either before,
during, or after the ICO. Thus, the plaintiff sued for rescission under the private
cause of action relating to unregistered securities sales found at Section 12(a)(1)
of the '33 Act. 129 When discussing the Howey test, the court emphasized that the
analysis should be based on the economic realities of the underlying transaction.
Noting that all potential profits were "entirely reliant" on the success of the
blockchain platform, the decision, likewise, emphasized that the issuer had
advertised "serious people from many prosperous countries" were investing in the
coins. 130
Separately, the states have weighed in on the relevant definition in a
conflicting and cursory fashion. When state approaches are too varied, model
"codes" can often harmonize the legal field. For example, all 50 states have
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in largely common variations. Closer to
the topic at hand, the Uniform Securities Act of 1954 succeeded in inspiring and/or
conforming state "Blue Sky statutes" throughout the country. Likewise, a budding
movement exists to consistently adopt a proposed "Virtual Currency Businesses
Act" among state legislatures. 131 That movement has garnered only a modicum of
interest.

Individualized legislation among the states ranges from measures inviting

129 15 U.S.C. § 771(1). Separately, Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act creates a private
cause of action against the seller for investors who purchase a security sold by means of an
oral communication or prospectus including a material misstatement or omission. The
provision was held to apply to only formal, registered offerings in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
Inc., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
130 Balestra, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 356-57.

131 See UNIF. REG. OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (UNIF. L. COMM'N

2017).
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virtual businesses through tax advantages (e.g., New Jersey 132), to those
memorializing salutary federal "transmitter" developments (e.g., Wisconsin"), to
those demanding registration (e.g., New York). 1" Perhaps more telling are the
standards evolving from state disciplinary actions against promoters seeking to
maximize investor interest in technologies through misstatements and/or fraud. In
a 2014 disciplinary Complaint, the Missouri Securities Commission expressly
faulted the defendants (Virtual Miners) for "not disclosing, among others, that
virtual currencies are not backed by a central bank/are not insured and no way is
available to reverse a virtual currency transaction. 135
Concurrently, the umbrella organization for the states has simply warned
investors of the likelihood of fraud in digital asset offerings. To wit, the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an entity that predates
the federalization of securities laws and serves as the voice of state securities
regulators, routinely lists crypto-fraud among its top 10 investor concerns. 136
Although the organization has no rulemaking or enforcement apparatus, its
warnings can be both pointed and colorful:
Virtual reality may exist only in science fiction, but consumers
now are able to purchase goods and services with virtual money
such as Bitcoin, PP Coin and other digital currencies. Unlike
traditional coinage, these alternatives typically are not backed by
tangible assets, are not issued by a governmental authority and are
subject to little or no regulation. The value of Bitcoins and other
digital currencies is highly volatile and the concept behind the
currency is difficult to understand even for sophisticated financial
experts given the complicated mathematical algorithms that
132 The Garden State is considering a fully state-based protocol and, in 2020, took up

the "Digital Asset and Blockchain Technology Act." See Turner Wright, New Jersey
Introduces Bill to Regulate Cryptocurrenciesat State Level, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 24,
2020),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/assemblywoman-introduces-digital-asset-andblockchain-technology-act.
133 Wisconsin's money transmitter license applies to those entities converting and
selling cryptocurrency. See Wisconsin Money Transmitter Laws, SHIPKEVICH, PLLC,
https://moneytransmitterlaw.com/state-laws/wisconsin/ (last visited May 14, 2021).
134 Since 2015 New York's "bitlicense" demands registration with the state and other
routine supervisory activities. See Virtual Currency Businesses, N.Y. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS.
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/appsand_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses (last visited May
13, 2021).
135 Virtual Mining, Corp., Case No. AP-14-09 (Mo. Sec. of State June 2, 2014),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/cmsimages/SECurities/orders/AP-14-09.pdf (prelim. cease and
desist order).
136 Top Investor Threats, N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N, http://www.nasaa.org/3752/
top-investor-threats/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
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determine when new blocks of coins will be released. This
environment has provided fertile ground for scam artists to
capitalize on the increasing popularity and acceptance of digital
currencies. Investors should be aware that investments that
incorporate abstract money systems present very real risks,
including the possibility of virtual reality leaving an investor
virtually broke NASAA. 137
Such characterization, while undoubtedly part of the debate over the
appropriate degree attending ideal regulation, does not answer the question.
Accordingly, the harsh solution of application of the federal securities laws appears
poised to continue, with noteworthy fines and resultant headlines. In the long term,
the greatest chance for peaceful coexistence between the regulators and the
entrepreneurs advancing blockchain is perhaps concrete SEC rulemaking. The
SEC's ability to fashion formal guidance exceeds even its storied litigation talents.
Formal and final rulemaking could serve to satisfy the competing needs of
enforcement and education. For the time being, such rulemaking has taken the
form of two, informal digital "token" proposals floated for public review, the
subject of the next section.
III. ANALYSIS: COMMISSIONER PEIRCE'S "TOKEN 2.0" PROPOSAL 138
A.

A More GranularStudy of SEC Cyber Actions to Date

Since 2013, the Commission has initiated over 70 disciplinary actions against
those originating, selling, or advertising crypto arrangements that were not
registered with the SEC. 139 The overwhelming majority of these cases (c. 65%)
involve alleged violations of Section 5 of the 1933 Act for the sale of unregistered
"securities," and often, Section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act for concurrently
engaging in fraud. These actions routinely result in settlement; one glaring
example is the pending litigation with Ripple Labs. 140 A demarcation by nature of
137

Id.
The first proposal (i.e., "Token 1.0") was shared by Commissioner Peirce in
February 2020. See Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Running on
Empty: A Proposalto Fill Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020).
139 A separate tally of approximately 20 actions during the same time frame focuses
upon online "account intrusions" or the "dark web." See Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.SEC.gov/spotlight/cyberSECurity-enforcementactions (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
140 A rare defendant committed to contesting allegation of unregistered sales of
securities is Ripple, the digital coins of which comprised an offering exceeding $1 billion.
See Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20-CV-10832, 2021 WL
1814771 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020).
138
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defendant is pictured by the chart below.
Crypto Actions by the Commission 141
Type/Defendant

Frequency/Years

Examples

Issuers

c. 45 occasions; 2014present

In re Erik T. Voorhees,142 SEC

BrokerDealers/Sellers

c. 10 occasions; 2016present

SEC v. Bitcoin Investment Trust
(registered broker-dealer)144

Touters

c. 5 occasions; 2018-

SEC v. Khaled, Mayweather
(celebrities touting digital coin
offerings without disclosing
compensation received) 145

present

Other

141

c. 10 occasions; 2013present

v. Krstic143

SEC v. Garza (bitcoin mining
company) 146 ; SEC v. Coburn
(trading platform operating as
147
an "exchange")

The referenced actions are available in chronological format at
https://www.SEC.gov/spotlight/cyberSECurity-enforcement-actions (last visited May 18,
2021). Those entries link to the corresponding SEC Complaint; per the Acts, the
Commission can commence actions both internally at administrative hearing, see section
19 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(t), (u), or in federal district court, see section 20(b) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(t), (v). Court is normally reserved for the non-professional.
142 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges Bitcoin Entrepreneur
with Offering Unregistered Securities (June 3, 2014), https://www.SEC.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-111.
143 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges Three Individuals in
Digital Asset Frauds (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2021-22.
14 Bitcoin Inv. Trust, Exchange Act Release No. 78282, 2016 WL 4363462 (July 11,
2016).
145 Khaled Order, supra note 123; Mayweather Order, supra note 120. See also
Steven Seagal, Securities Act Release No. 10760, 2020 WL 950728 (ALJ Feb. 27, 2020)
(punishing a Hollywood screen actor who touted a digital offering); Gregory Mott, Actor
Steven Seagal Fined by SEC for Touting Bitcoin Offering, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/actor-steve-seagal-fined-by-sec-for-toutingbitcoin-offering.
146 Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'nv. Garza, No. 3:15-CV-1760 (D. Conn. Dec. 1,
2015).
147 Zachary Coburn, Exchange Act Release No. 84553 (AU Nov. 8, 2018); see also
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges EtherDelta Founder with
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In sum, SEC Enforcement action in this area has been consistent, frequent,
and successful. It has reached both entities and their officers, foreign concerns, 148

those seeking to alter/improve upon existing alt-currencies, 149 and those simply
creating their own digital coins. 150 Defendants have included a former state
senator,151 a Hollywood actor,1 s2 an online adult entertainment marketplace,153 the
pioneer in computer antivirus software, 154 and a famed political lobbyist. 155
Defendants have represented over 15 U.S. states, and actions have even proceeded
where entities/activities are arguably subject to other regulatory protocol. 156

Operating an Unregistered Exchange (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www. SEC.gov /news/pressrelease/2018-258. It bears noting that, while reading the tea leaves on a new agency
administration is always complicated, the new Commission Chairman seems poised to
support government action against unregistered crypto "exchanges" that attract investor
dollars. See Nikhilesh De, SEC Chair Gary Gensler Recommends Congress Regulate
Crypto Exchanges, COINDESK (May 6, 2021), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021

/05/06/sec-chair-gary-gensler-recommends-congress-regulate-crypto-exchanges/.
148 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Obtains Emergency
Asset Freeze, Charges Crypto Fund Manager with Fraud (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-341; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Charges ICO Research and Rating Provider with Failing to Disclose It Was
Paid to Tout Digital Assets (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.SEC.gov/news/pressrelease/2019-157.
149 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges Issuer, CEO, and
Lobbyist with Defrauding Investors in AML BitCoin (June 25, 2020), https://www.SEC
.gov/news/press-release/2020-145.
15 Solutech, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10853, Exchange Act Release No.
899999, 2020 WL 9171106 (ALJ Sept. 25, 2020).
151 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Emergency Action Stops Digital
Asset Scam (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-66.
152 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Actor Steven Seagal Charged with
Unlawfully Touting Digital Asset Offering (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news
/press-release/2020-42.
13 Jonathan C. Lucas, Litigation Release No. 24607, 2019 WL 4596722 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2019).
154 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges John McAfee with
Fraudulently Touting ICOs (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-246.
155 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges Issuer, CEO, and
Lobbyist with Defrauding Investors in AML BitCoin (June 25, 2020),

https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-145.
156 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Unregistered ICO Issuer
Agrees to Disable Tokens and Pay Penalty for Distribution to Harmed Investors (Sept. 15,
2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-211 (disciplining a sports gambling
enterprise).
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Owing to Division of Enforcement expertise and explicit statutory authority, 15 7 the
SEC has both acted quickly to prevent coin offerings 158 and acted in hindsight to
punish alleged wrongdoers after the offerings. To be sure, actions are sometimes
aided by disturbing attendant misstatements or theft. 159 While some defendants
allegedly orchestrated schemes merely involving cryptocurrency, the majority of
cases involve the issuance of digital coins/tokens, the revenues from which are
nearly unfathomable. 160
The Commission's litigation strategy has continued with a consistent legal
approach (i.e., alleged violation of 1933 Act Section 5), yet its penalties have
ratcheted up from modest fines to the total amount of the coin offering. 161 Intent is
relevant only for determining sanctions; the SEC cyber actions evidence findings

Both section 8A of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1, and section 21C of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3, authorize the SEC to seek an internal cease-and-desist order
whenever "any person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision ....
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Loci Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10950, Exchange Act
Release No. 92215, 2021 WL 2554441 (June 22, 2021) ("Respondents Loci and Wise shall
cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of
Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.").
158 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., ICO Issuer Settles SEC
Registration Charges, Agrees to Return Funds and Register Tokens as Securities (Feb. 19,
2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-37.
159 See, e.g., Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Nat. Diamonds Inv. Co., No. 19CV-80633, 2019 WL 2202144, at 18 (S.D. Fla., May 13, 2019) ("In addition to operating
a multi-layer Ponzi scheme, Aman, Natural Diamonds, and Eagle used investors' funds to
purchase horses and riding lessons for Aman's adult son, pay Aman's church and pastors
more than $1.5 million, pay H .Seigel and his company more than $3 million, and pay more
than $3 million to Aman directly or for his other personal expenditures, including shopping
at Gucci and paying the rent on his home .... ").
160 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Unregistered $25.5 Million
ICO Issuer to Return Money for Distribution to Investors (May 28, 2020),
https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-124
($25.5 million offering); Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Halts Alleged $1.7 Billion Unregistered Digital
Token Offering (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212 ($1.7
billion offering). The pending litigation against Ripple Labs seeks restitution of an offering
of $1.3 billion. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC Charges Ripple and Two
Executives with Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec. 22, 2020),
"

157

https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020-338.
161 See, e.g., Kik Interactive Inc., Litigation Release No. 24493, 2019 WL 2387042
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018) (seeking rescission of the entire $100 million unregistered
offering). The complaint against Kik was later settled in October 2020. See Press Release,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Kik Interactive for
Unregistered Offering (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/press-release/2020262.
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against those acting perhaps naively162 as well as those acting in blatant bad
faith. 163 All cases are publicized by Commission "Press Releases," disclosed, on
average, once a month. 164 Activity is patently increasing, as a total of 6 cyber
actions in the years 2016/2017165 grew to nearly 40 actions in 2019/2020.166
Thus, analysis reveals an enforcement strategy capturing both investment
professionals and newcomers, entities domestic and foreign, issuers and thirdparty endorsers ("touters"), and parties acting both negligently and of ill-design. If
a primary emphasis can be discerned, it could be said to be twofold: 1) the danger
of issuer ease of entry into the market, and 2) the danger of investor passivity.
Most significantly, all cases are tied to the pivotal finding of a security in a truly
unconventional arrangement, defined neither by statute nor SEC rule.
Therefore, such disciplinary actions commence with and thrive upon an
unchallenged application of the Howey test. The winning streak is bound to end as
the defense Bar gains game footage to view - fans of securities regulation note that
the SEC settled its allegations against Kik Interactive for 5 cents on the dollar. 167
More importantly, at least one Commissioner has loudly supported the dual notions
of 1) providing a safe harbor for issuers of digital coins, and 2) ensuring investors
that their purchases are legal. The clearest attempts at progressing that provocative
approach are detailed and analyzed below.
B.

Token Proposal 1.0 (2020)

To be sure, there is not unanimous support at the top level of the Commission
for either the aggressive application of the generic Howey test or the hodgepodge
of threatening pronouncements. Since 2017, as Commission Enforcement actions
have increased dramatically in frequency, 168 Commissioner Hester Peirce (the selfproclaimed "Crypto Mom" 169 advancing market interests) has decried the lack of
See, e.g., Erik T. Voorhees, Securities Act Release No. 9592, 2014 WL 2465620
(June 3, 2014).
163 See, e.g., supra note 148.
164 Press Releases, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 3, 2022),
162

https://www.SEC.gov/news /pressreleases.
165 Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N
(Jan. 3, 2022),

https://www.SEC.gov /spotlight/cyberSECurity-enforcement-actions.
166
Id.
167 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra
note 161.
168 See Cyber Enforcement Actions, supra note 165.
169 See Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks
Before the
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: Broken Windows (Nov. 4, 2019). In this
speech, Commissioner Peirce both owned the moniker "crypto mom" and decried the
speedy application of securities laws to coin offerings, an SEC practice she said "hindered"
economic growth. Id.

5 1St
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clear guidance for those issuing digital assets or shares. 17 0
In early 2020, Commissioner Peirce offered a provocative change to the SEC
routine of suing issuers that had gone about issuing digital "tokens" improperly.
Specifically, in a speech in Chicago, the Commissioner colorfully noted the need
for practicality in fashioning an overdue regulatory response:
It is important to write rules that well-intentioned people can
follow. When we see people struggling to find a way both to
comply with the law and accomplish their laudable objectives, we
need to ask ourselves whether the law should change to enable
them to pursue their efforts in confidence that they are doing so
legally.1 7 1
While confessing that her own ideas had yet to be finalized, the Commissioner
noted that the ultimate SEC response affected at least five areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Issuers releasing tokens to be used in a network,
Entities "providing custody for crypto assets,"
Issuers "launching an exchange-traded product based on bitcoin,"
Broker-dealers handling cryptocurrency related transactions, and
Entities establishing alternative trading centers on which to exchange
"crypto assets."172

Contemporaneously, the Commissioner stated that "our securities laws stand in the
way of innovation." Nonetheless, she limited her suggestions to the first of these
affected areas, token issuers. To that end, Peirce highlighted that the fear of SEC
enforcement activity for such issuers is both "real" and "not unfounded." 173
See, e.g., Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at
Securities Enforcement Forum: How We Howey (May 9, 2019).
171 Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Running on Empty: A
Proposal to Fill the Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020)
(including the text of the first Token Proposal).
172 Id.
173 Id. It is worth noting that an explanation of policy published by the SEC
Division
of Corporation Finance in April 2019 has become part of the pleadings in private litigation
against digital coin issuers. See, e.g., Complaint, Friel v. Dapper Labs, Inc., No. 1:21-CV05837, at 1 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021) (state class action). The complaint directly
quotes the SEC pronouncement that:
170

The U.S. Supreme Court's Howey case and subsequent case law have
found that an "investment contract" exists when there is the investment

34

CORP. & BUS. L..

V
Vol.
3:1: 2022

Explaining that such enforcement relied heavily on the application of the Howey
test to novel arrangements, Peirce continued by both politely mocking the
eponymous case and noting the commentary of experts that it relies heavily on the
subjective (i.e., investment) intent of the asset purchaser. 17 4
Accordingly, the baleful effect of instinctively applying the "infamous"
Howey test to all crypto deals was directly assailed as thwarting economic growth:
We have created a regulatory Catch 22. Would-be networks
cannot get their tokens out into people's hands because their
tokens are potentially subject to the securities laws. However,
would-be networks cannot mature into a functional or
decentralized network that is not dependent upon a single person
or group to carry out the essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts unless the tokens are distributed to and freely transferable
among potential users, developers, and participants of the
network. The securities laws cannot be ignored, but neither can
we as securities regulators ignore the conundrum our laws
create. 175
The Commissioner's initial attempt at jumpstarting SEC rulemaking in this
area chose the most frequent target of SEC discipline. It also highlighted the
assistance required by (unnamed) budding token networks (i.e., issuers conveying
digital coins/tokens to purchasers for use in an environment controlled by the

of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the efforts of others. The so-called
"Howey test" applies to any contract, scheme, or transaction, regardless
of whether it has any of the characteristics of typical securities. The focus
of the Howey analysis is not only on the form and terms of the instrument
itself (in this case, the digital asset) but also on the circumstances
surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is offered, sold,
or resold (which includes secondary market sales). Therefore, issuers
and other persons and entities engaged in the marketing, offer, sale,
resale, or distribution of any digital asset will need to analyze the relevant
transactions to determine if the federal securities laws apply.
Complaint, Friel v. Dapper Labs, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-05837, at 1 50 (S.D.N.Y. July
7, 2021) (quoting STRATEGIC HUB FOR INNOVATION & FIN. TECH., SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, FRAMEWORK FOR "INVESTMENT CONTRACT" ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL

ASSETS (Apr.

3, 2019), https://www.SEC.gov/corpfin/framework-investmentcontract-analysis-digital-assets).
14 Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Running on Empty: A
Proposal to Fill the Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020).
175 Id.
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issuer 176). While noting that there was always the availability of registration (or
exemption therefrom),177 and that there had been some SEC No Action Letters 178
issued to networks, 179 the Token 1.0 proposal emphasized the urgency of the
moment. To that end, Token 1.0 clearly delineated three objectives: "requiring
disclosures tailored to [issuer] needs, preserving the application of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws, and giving [investors] .
in networks of interest to them."180

.

. an ability to participate

Coincidentally, the suggested "safe harbor" was described as seeking to
exempt three entities, activities, or products:
(1) the offer and sale of tokens from the provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933, other than the antifraud provisions, (2) the
tokens from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and (3) persons engaged in certain token transactions from
the definitions of "exchange," "broker," and "dealer" under the
1934 Act.
Such clarity of purpose was perhaps surpassed by the contribution of new
vocabulary: "issuers" (i.e., Howey "Promoters") was scaled back and labeled
"initial development team" in a nod to the goal of networks proving both legitimate
176 Ideally, a token network would function in the same manner as the use of cartoon
themed coins at a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant, wherein a unique currency only has value
in the children's arcade. Indeed, the metaphor has been used by officials on occasion to
explain how digital tokens can avoid application of the securities laws. See, e.g., Lydia
Beyoud, 'Chuck E. Cheese' Test May Tell SEC If Crypto Token a Security, BLOOMBERG
L. (Dec. 12, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/chuck-echeese-test-may-tell-SEC-if-crypto-token-a-SECurity.
177 Specifically, Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-262 (2021), or Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. § 230.500-508 (2021). In securities law, an SEC "Regulation" is a set of rules aimed
at the same purpose. Separately, it was noted that, at the time of the Token 1.0 Proposal,
issuers had used the exemptive process, but no issuer had utilized the formal registration
process. See SEC Speech, "Running on Empty: A Proposal to Fill the Gap Between
Regulation and Decentralization" (Feb. 6, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06 (fn. 7).
178 The SEC No-Action Letter is a storied compromise among the agency's arsenal
that communicates to the issuer or other person that intended activities as proposed by the
requester will not prompt enforcement action. Like the IRS Private Letter Ruling, the NoAction Letter is rescindable and at no time has any bearing on the activities of parties other
than
the
direct
addressee.
See
No
Action
Letters,
INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-actionletters (Jan. 3, 2022).
179 See Turnkey Jet, Inc., supra note 125; Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., SEC Staff NoAction Letter, 2019 WL 8128104 (July 25, 2019).
"0 Running on Empty, supra note 171.
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and transitory.181 In sum, the safe harbor's requirements would impose obligations
for a period of three years. After that time, it was hoped that "network maturity"
would be reached, and that issued tokens would achieve a functionality rendering
applicability of the securities laws superfluous. 18 2
Overall, balancing the aims of network growth, disclosure, and liquidity,
Token Proposal 1.0 laid out for discussion the hypothetical "SEC Rule 195."183
The safe harbor suggestion was supported by reference to SEC cases or secondary
authorities. The proposal was directly aimed at exclusion of four Exchange Act
provisions through the creation of a corresponding tally of SEC Rules.184 In short,
Token Proposal 1.0 would have served to shield issuers from the Acts under a
sunset safe harbor while avoiding discussion of the role of third parties (e.g.,
trading platforms, custodial broker dealers, promoters) and remaining silent on
other investor protections previously established through litigation.
C.

Token Proposal2.0 (2021)

Commissioner Pierce urged feedback on Token Proposal 1.0 via links to SEC
e-mail addresses, including her own. 18 5 In early 2021, she released on the SEC
website and elsewhere "Token Proposal 2.0," her second attempt at impromptu
rulemaking1 86 (TP 2.0).187 While the outline for the safe harbor was largely kept
intact, further details and substance were provided. In the main, TP 2.0 requires
semi-annual updates by the developers of the cryptocurrencies, as well as an "exit
report" upon reaching the 3-year anniversary of a currency's launch; moreover, TP
181
182

Id.
Id.

SEC Rules, when appearing in 3-digit format, indicate an elaboration on the 1933
Act (e.g., "Rule 151", 17 C.F.R. § 230.151 (1986), which provides a safe harbor from
Section 5 application for certain variable annuity contracts).
184 Specifically, sections of the 1933 Act defining "exchange," "broker," and
"dealer," as well as avoidance of the registration requirement found at Section 12 of the
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2015).
183

185

Interestingly, Commissioner Peirce solicited comments on the 1.0 Proposal, to be

submitted to "Github," a collaborative forum which aims to assist software developers. See
GITHUB, https://github.com/. The Commission launched its own digital entrepreneurial
site, "FinHub," in December 2020. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., SEC
Announces Office Focused on Innovation and Financial Technology: FinHub Specialized
Unit to Become Stand-Alone Office (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.SEC.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-303.
186 Public Statement, Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Token
Safe Harbor Proposal 2.0 (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.SEC.gov/news /publicstatement/peirce-statement-token-safe-harbor-proposal-2.0 [hereinafter TP 2.0].
187 TP 2.0 was said to have been informed by comments from "the crypto community,
securities lawyers, and members of the public." Id.
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2.0 includes guidance for the outside counsel likely to prepare such filings with the
Commission. 188
The newer proposal remains technical in verbiage and draws its aim from
several areas of SEC rulemaking on the topic of issuer exemptions from
registration. Indeed, an early note to TP 2.0 repeats a disclaimer found in several
SEC exemptions:
Rule 195 is not an exclusive safe harbor. A person who does not
meet all of the applicable conditions of Rule 195 still may claim
any other available exemption under the Securities Act of 1933
for the offer and sale of Tokens.
Such "non-exclusivity" is a staple of exemption law and inures to the benefit of
the issuer: If technicalities are not complied with, the issuer may invoke other
provisions declaring the 1933 Act inapplicable. 89
Of course, TP 2.0 reflects the views of the office of a sole SEC Commissioner
and does not comport with APA rulemaking. Nonetheless, the proposal marks a
turnaround in the Commission's approach to the thorny problem of ever-changing
cryptocurrency deals. At the present time, the notion centers on four operative
parts, the most salient of which is described and analyzed below.1 90
(i)

The Definitions

TP 2.0 includes but a modest set of definitions - four in total, placed at the
end of the proposal.191 To bring the exemptive safe harbor more in line with
existing law and trends, credibility could be established by placing them earlier in
188

Id.

189

See, e.g., SEC Rule 500 within the Regulation D exemption provides:
Attempted compliance with any rule in Regulation D does not act as an
exclusive election; the issuer can also claim the availability of any other
applicable exemption. For instance, an issuer's failure to satisfy all the
terms and conditions of rule 506(b) shall not raise any presumption that
the exemption provided by Section 4(a)(2) of the Act is not available.

17 C.F.R. § 230.500(c) (internal citations omitted).
190 For ease of use, the Token Proposal 2.0 is included in large part as "Appendix A"
to this article.
191 Namely, "Initial Development Team"; "Network Maturity"; "Related Person";
and "Token." Proposed Rule 195(k) in TP 2.0, supra note 186. Elsewhere within the
proposal, certain terms are defined by reference to existing statutory provisions. E.g.,
Proposed Rule 195(i) ("For purposes of Section 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act of 933, a
'qualified purchaser' includes .... ").
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any resulting proposed Rule.
Of greater moment is the definition of digital coin "issuer," which has
deliberately been supplanted by the more generic term "initial development
team." 192 Such an opaque reference conjures notions of multiple parties immersed
in technology; however, the case law paints a different picture. More pointedly,
the definition attaches only to initial, formally named Promoters, "[a]ny person,
group of persons, or entity that provides the essential managerial efforts for the
development of the network prior to reaching Network Maturity and makes the
initial filing of a notice of reliance on this safe harbor." 193
Such brevity excludes the assignees of the Promoter, as well as host of
secondary actors and affiliates. Since the language expressly borrows from case
law interpreting "efforts of others" (namely, SEC v. Glenn Turner),194 other equal
authorities should be referenced. 19 5 In that fashion, the primary ill targeted by the
Howey test, the forced registration of deals depending on Promoter expertise, is
best eradicated.
The import of this definition cannot be overstated. Crypto deals are being
regulated out of concern for the uninitiated. To strike a balance, the Commission
has employed a common law test best summarized by its concluding element - the
oft-examined "efforts of others." Examples of this element's predominance
abound in both the DAO Report 196 and the SEC cyber actions to date. 197 Limiting
this class of examinees clouds the question of whether the coin "network" has
proven itself to be utilitarian rather than investment-oriented.
Such an ideal state for the Promoter is called "Network Maturity," similarly
included in TP 2.0's short list of definitions:
192 For further ease of reference, "initial development team" shall be replaced in this
analysis with the truer concept, "Promoter."
193 Proposed Rule 195, supra note 191, at
(k)(1).
194 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-83
(9th

Cir. 1973).
195 Namely, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 548 (D.C.
Cir.
1996) ("predominant efforts") and Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 483 n.14 (5th Cir. 1974) ("significant efforts"). The Supreme Court has not
ruled on the precise definition of this 4 th Howey element.
196 See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying
text.
197 See, e.g., Enigma MPC, Securities Act Release No. 10755, 2020 WL 821462, at
*3 (Feb. 19, 2020) ("ENG Tokens derived their value - and therefore, the ENG Token
purchasers could reasonably expect a return on their investments - from the efforts of
Enigma to develop its business."); CarrierEQ, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10575, 2018
WL 6017664, at *3 (Nov. 16, 2018) ("AirFox knew that investors wanted the ability to
freely trade AirTokens in the secondary market. Prior to the initial coin offering, AirFox
made clear to prospective investors that it planned to enter into agreements with token
exchanges to ensure that the AirToken would be traded on the secondary market.").
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(i) Not economically or operationally controlled and is not
reasonably likely to be economically or operationally controlled
or unilaterally changed by any single person, entity, or group of
persons or entities under common control, except that networks
for which the Initial Development Team owns more than 20% of
Tokens or owns more than 20% of the means of determining
network consensus cannot satisfy this condition; or

.

(ii) Functional, as demonstrated by the holders' use of Tokens for
the transmission and storage of value on the network, the
participation in an application running on the network, or
otherwise in a manner consistent with the utility of the network.
198

This definition again skews too much in favor of the Promoter. The delineation of
a 20% threshold guides the promoter on how to avoid classification as Promoter;
to that end, any of the aforementioned terms linked to efforts would suffice as
replacement (e.g., "significant," "predominant," or "essential managerial").199
(ii)

The Exemption Itself

The Exemption excludes Tokens from application of the 1933 Act, subject to
a handful of conditions. Most noteworthy here is the requirement that the
Promoters "intend for the network on which the Token functions to reach Network
Maturity within three years." 200 Further, the Tokens must be issued for the
purposes of "facilitating access to, participation on, or the development of the
network"2 1 (as opposed to profits).
Regarding the legal scope of the exemption, the exemption needs to expressly
reference both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Both of the Acts have expressly
worded definitional sections, and either can be used as a predicate for application
of the securities laws against various parties and concerning numerous activities.202
To avoid the very unexpected applications contemplated by industry advocates,
any resulting SEC rule would benefit from a blanket reference to the dual

Proposed Rule 195, supra note 191, at (k)(2).
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Proposed Rule 195, supra note 191, at (a)(1).
201 Id. at (a)(3).
202 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (addressing allegations
of accountant fraud tied to definitions of "security" located in both Section 2 of the 1933
Act and Section 3 of the 1934 Act).
198

199
200
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definitions within the Acts. 203
Regarding the three-year grace period, some specific reference could be made
to the source of this largesse. While the "Preamble" to TP 2.0 mentions this
presumptive time period as serving varied purposes, such a delay in registration
and disclosure could be interpreted as gamesmanship tilted in favor of Promoters:
The time period for a claim under Section 5 is limited to three years by the statute
of repose found in Section 13 of the 1933 Act. 20 4 This specter could be removed
by adding to any resulting proposed SEC rule a clause guaranteeing the
Commission's right to amend this grace period.
Further, a reference to Promoter intentions without elaboration simply opens
the issue for debate. Indeed, in a variety of securities law provisions, similar
language requiring evidence of intent has spelled the ultimate disuse of the
provision. 205 If a Promoter intends in good faith to use proceeds solely for
development, then this should be stated in writing upfront. Such a promise is
routinely required in registered offerings and appears in the clearly labeled "Use
of Proceeds" section required by Item 504 of Regulation S-K. 2 06

Curiously, TP 2.0 makes almost random reference to Section 6 of the 1934
Act,
which requires registration of securities "exchanges." See Proposed Rule 195, supra note
191, at (g). That reference is not required, as the failure to locate a "security" precludes any
related trading platform outside the reach of the Acts.
204 Section 13 of the 1933 Act, although a bit cryptic itself, has long been interpreted
as limiting actions premised upon the sale of an unregistered security to three years from
the conclusion of the offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (precluding private actions under
Section 12(a)(1) "more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the
203

public").
205 See, e.g., Section 18 of the 1934 Act, which establishes a private cause of action
for misleading SEC filings. That provision, although well meaning, contains an intent
requirement long-blamed for its succumbing to Rule 10b-5 as the plaintiff's weapon of
choice. See John A. Occhipinti, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting
the Bite Back into the Toothless Tiger, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 115 (1978).
206 An omnibus tool, Regulation S-K instructs issuers
on numerous filing
requirements. Regarding the planned use of offering proceeds, issuers are advised as
follows:

State the principal purposes for which the net proceeds to
the registrant from the securities to be offered are intended to be used
and the approximate amount intended to be used for each such purpose.
Where registrant has no current specific plan for the proceeds, or a
significant portion thereof, the registrant shall so state and discuss the
principal reasons for the offering.
17 CFR § 229.504 (2013).
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The Disclosures

The Promoters must file a "notice of reliance" and an "exit report" with the
SEC. These formal statements, serving to bookend the three-year period in which
"network maturity" is reached, would include such details as an indication of the
Promoters207 and the efforts at "decentralization"2 08 (i.e., minimizing Promoter
participation in the network). The latter is hauntingly familiar of juridical
interpretations of Howey's fourth element where it requires an explanation of the
Promoter's "ongoing involvement"2 9 and "continuing activities."210
Indeed, such concerns are hinted at in TP 2.0's verbiage establishing a
"[w]arning to token purchasers" that purchases involve "a high degree of risk and
the potential loss of money." The last exemptive development - to address the
growing field of crowdfunding - required proof of a minimal degree of assets
available for investment. 211 Surely, the purchase of tokens, a speculative
undertaking, is worthy of the same requirement, at least as long as the network is
in its initial three-year development phase.
Concurrently, the TP 2.0 "disclosures" section would be well served to
include the actual warning to investors. Such has been required of newcomers to
margin accounts for over twenty years. The dire, cautionary statements contained
in the required "Margin Disclosure Statement" serve to minimize allegations of
predatory lending by broker dealers while ensuring that the industry professional
focuses on the means of investor. 22 A similar, universal bulleting of investor risks
could only help a network gain credibility.
Also, the required disclosure of 5% of Promoter tokens is far too subjective.
If seeking to ensure market stability, such limitation should be more properly tied
to the outstanding "float" of tokens. Such a notion has long worked well within
SEC Rule 144,213 which provides a safe harbor for the laymen selling restricted
securities when such a sale is minimal in market impact.
Stated otherwise, the required disclosures would gain broader acceptance if

207

Id. at (c).

208

Id. at (f)(1)(i)(A).
Id. at (f)(1)(i)(B).

209
2 10

Id.
211 Adopted by the SEC in 2015, Regulation Crowdfunding requires issuers to ensure

that investors meet both minimal asset requirements and receive disclosures related to the
offering. See Regulation Crowdfunding, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.SEC.gov
/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding (Mar. 17, 2021).
212 See FINRA, Rule 2264, Margin Disclosure Statement
(2011).
213 One condition that must be met by the seller of restricted securities (i.e., securities
issued under an exemption) is the submission of Form 144 when such sale constitutes 1%
or more of the float for any 3-month period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e).
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including differing versions for differing audiences. TP 2.0 essentially acts as an
exemption from registration; the most enduring exemptions have been required to
disclose in parallel fashion to the SEC and the potential investors. 214 Such
duplicate course for required disclosures could only inure to the benefit of a
Promoter; moreover, in its current form, the disclosures are overwrought with
technicalities and formalities that would pause the reading of professional and
layman alike.2 5
(iv)

The Need for Grandfatheringof Existing Exemptions

A grandfathering of existing pronouncements and cases needs to be ensured.
While allowance has been made to exempt from safe harbor usage all tokens
previously registered with the Commission,21 6 the "law" of Tokens since 2013 has
already rendered the Securities Act of 1933 inapplicable to certain products and/or
transactions.

For example, on a mundane level, broker dealers have expressly lobbied for
and gained exemption from the Securities Act for activities undertaken in the role
of custodian for customer digital assets. 217
Further, issues have sometimes obtained relief from the Securities Act for
carefully crafted digital activities. For example, in April 2019, the SEC Division
of Corporate Finance delivered the most evenhanded Commission message yet
when it issued a No Action Letter to a company called TurnKey Jet, Inc.218 That
letter advised the prospective issuer of digital tokens that enforcement action
would not be taken by the SEC in the absence of registration if the issuer had a
fully developed platform, the tokens could only be transferred to investor wallets,
the tokens had a nominal value, and the issuer did not market the tokens as

214 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (requiring, under Regulation A, an "offering

statement" for the Commission and a parallel "offering circular" for the investor); 17
C.F.R. § 230.503 (requiring, under Regulation D, Form D to be filed with the
Commission); and 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (requiring, under Regulation Crowdfunding,
similar disclosures for the SEC and the investors).
215 See, e.g., Proposed Rule 195, supra note 191, at (b)(1) (requiring information like
the source code and token economics to be provided on a freely accessible public website
before an Initial Development Team may file a notice of reliance on the safe harbor).
216 Id. at (h) (requiring a degree of SEC action to act as a complete shield in the
exclusion).
217 Seward & Kissel LLP, SEC Permits Specialized Broker-Dealers to Custody
DigitalAsset Securities (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.sewkis.com/publications/sec-permits-

specialized-broker-dealers-to-custody-digital-asset-securities/ (noting that outgoing Chair
Jay Clayton announced the permissive framework on his last day in office).
218 Turnkey Jet, Inc., supra note 125.
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potentially appreciating in price. 219
Separately, "stable coins" used for the temporary storage of investor assets
after conversion by broker dealers have been in use for several years.220
It is axiomatic that full registration can cripple business models. Indeed, the
SEC's Form S-1 confesses that nearly a thousand hours are required for its
completion.2 21 Yet, TP 2.0 in its present state goes too far in attempting to create a
clean slate. Even apart from existing law on exemptions, there exists authority
among practitioners.22 and yesteryear's courts

23

alike for adherence to the spirit

219 The SEC listed the following restrictions in support of its position:
1) [TurnKey Jet] will not use any funds from Token sales to develop the TKJ
Platform, Network, or App, and each of these will be fully developed and
operational at the time any Tokens are sold;
2) The Tokens will be immediately usable for their intended functionality
(purchasing air charter services) at the time they are sold;
3) TKJ will restrict transfers of Tokens to TKJ Wallets only, and not to
wallets external to the Platform;
4) TKJ will sell Tokens at a price of one USD per Token throughout the life
of the Program, and each Token will represent a TKJ obligation to supply air
charter services at a value of one USD per Token;
5) If TKJ offers to repurchase Tokens, it will only do so at a discount to the
face value of the Tokens (one USD per Token) that the holder seeks to resell
to TKJ, unless a court within the United States orders TKJ to liquidate the
Tokens; and
6) The Token is marketed in a manner that emphasizes the functionality of
the Token, and not the potential for the increase in the market value of the
Token.
Id. at *1.
220 See Richard Satran, U.S. regulator's approval of stablecoin payments provides
regulatory building block, compliance challenge, RUETERS (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-stablecoin-approval/u-s-regulators-approval-ofstablecoin-payments-provides-regulatory-building-block-compliance-challenge-idUSKB
N29I2XZ (approving the limited use of stablecoins for commerce in what the author called
"training wheels" enabling the creation of compliance controls for more expansive uses of
digital currencies in the future).
221 Xgains4keeps Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933
(Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2012).
222 See CONCANNON ET AL., The Yellow Brick Road for Consumer Tokens: The Path
to SEC and CFTC Compliance an Update, BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY
REGULATION 2020 64, 65 (2d ed. 2020), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/theyellow-brick-road-for-consumer-tokens-path-to-SEC-and-cftc-compliance-an-update
("The SEC made clear [since 2017] that to the extent instruments have the indicia of
investment contracts, they should be offered and sold in compliance with the securities
laws.").
223 See, e.g., id. at 65 (discussing Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985)) (acknowledging a security could
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of the Howey test (i.e., the identification of truly passive investors gaining from
the efforts and expertise of issuer-promoters). To that end, a more proper balance
would arguably need to expand the definition of developers, provide for parallel
disclosures to investors, and comfort industry tacticians that allowances gained to
date shall not be lost.
(v)

The Need for ProtectionsAgainst Related Civil Litigation

If the first attempt at rulemaking is to provide safe harbor for issuers, then
such a rule must obviate parallel civil litigation. More to the point, class actions
should be precluded for activities during the three-year period. The Commission
has achieved such demarcation in the past without intolerable damage to investor
protection.224 Moreover, investors are still left with - among other things - actions
sounding fraudulent, at both the state and federal level.2
D.

5

Recap of Analysis

TP 2.0 is a difficult read. Its primary aim of educating Promoters and their
counsel make it divergent from traditional rulemaking. Countervailing legal
precepts are unsupported. At its core, it seeks to shield an overbroad (unnamed)
class of potential defendants.
Still, the notion of a sunset safe harbor is useful. The debate thereon shall
make legal discussions more proactive while acknowledging what we all already
know: Cryptocurrency arrangements in the form of digital tokens are not going
away. Concurrently, the field is often abused by fraudsters seeking an advantage
over the uninitiated, and thus, the SEC cannot be marginalized.
be found where "the issuer's marketing efforts centered on the establishment of a secondary
market and the opportunity for purchasers to profit from the enterprise" despite the nature
of the product being offered).
224 For example, Regulation FD, adopted in 2000, includes the following warning:
No effect on antifraud liability.
No failure to make a public disclosurepublic disclosure required solely
by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5) under the Securities Exchange Act.
17 C.F.R. § 243.102.
225 TP 2.0's attempts at preserving the applicability of anti-fraud provisions is a bit
confused. Proposed Rule 195, supra note 191, at (d) ("Limitation"). The proposal expressly
incorporates Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act (a provision that is intent-neutral) and Section
17 of the 1933 Act (the lesser of the SEC's anti-fraud provisions). Id. Rule 10b-5 is the
Commission weapon of choice. See supra, note 63; see also FAIRNESS, INC., supra note 39,
at Ch. IV.
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Nonetheless, any safe harbor designed to alleviate regulatory uncertainty
must take care not to erase precedent and pronouncement with a ten-year head
start.

Of greatest import is the preclusion of the Howey analysis. At its core, that
famed standard seeks to identify those individuals buying a dream of profits from
little effort; its four elements address both the investor's expectations (element 3)
and practical examinations (consideration offered, element 2; degree of promoter
efforts, element 4).226
Accordingly, TP 2.0 is a salutary beginning; to shore up its legality as it
moves toward formal rule proposal for a safe harbor from Howey, this Article
suggests the following initial amendments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Regarding definitions, "development team" must be broadened, made
more neutral, and made clearer by being termed "Promoter."
Likewise, "related persons" must include those third parties who would
own or tout the coins.
Regarding disclosures, these should be made upfront and simplified.
Likewise, such disclosures should include a warning for investors.
Regarding broker-dealers, the existing custodial exemption should be
codified.
Regarding technicalities, these should be moved to an "Appendix" or
reserved for any attendant SEC adopting release.
Regarding the three-year time period for exemption, stronger support
needs to be offered for a number oddly specific to the relevant time
limitation for Section 5 actions.
Overall, the process must migrate to APA Section 553 rulemaking, both
for purposes of finality and for the avoidance of cloistered input.

As stated effectively by Commissioner Peirce, with a new SEC Chairman
comes new opportunity.227 The SEC can avail itself of this fresh start to avoid the
morass occasioned by another 70 disciplinary decisions speaking to multiple legal
issues and concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A 3.0 SOLUTION

Cryptocurrency has taken a wild ride since 2008, with early players incurring

Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see also
supra notes 82-87.
227 TP 2.0, supra note 186.
226
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liabilities from charges ranging from ill-preparedness 228 to illegal sales. 229 It
cannot be overstated that the potential for anonymity in two-party transactions can
predominate all other factors, and that each incident of "ransomware" attacks (i.e.,
a crime enabled by cryptocurrency) furthers public mistrust. 230 SEC regulation is
unavoidable, but novel and difficult. Adding to the regulatory uncertainty has been
the empirical, dual-sided coin of agency indifference and overreach. 231 Naturally,
investor introductions to the bold technology have warned of a world fraught with
peril.232
Against this omnipresent, challenging backdrop, the SEC publicly emerged
as the primary regulator of alt-currency. 233 Although the states have also

228 Anthony Back, Blockchain & Crypto Hype Cycle: Where We're at and What's
Coming Next, THE BLOCKCHAIN REV. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/blockchainreview/blockchain-crypto-hype-cycle-where-were-at-and-what-s-coming-next-c71 cd3f60
688. See also Peter J. Henning, ForBitcoin, Square Peg Meets Round Hole Under the Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.con2013/12/09/for-bitcoin-squarepeg-meets-round-hole-under-the-law/; Princess Clark-Wendel, How Safe Is Your Wallet
from a Cyber-Attack?, FORBES (July 28, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/

sites/sungardas/2014/07/28/how-safe-is-your-bitcoin-wallet-from-a-cyber-attack/?sh=62
f0ad736f2c; Vitalik Buterin, Bitfloor Hacked, $250,000 Missing, BITCOIN MAG. (Sept. 5,
2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/2139/bitfloor-hacked-250000-missing/.
229 See Mridhula Raghavan & Sophie Knight, U.S. Authorities Probe Bitcoin
Exchanges over Illegal Transactions, REUTERS (May 19, 2014, 6:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-usa-crime-bitcoin-idUSBREA4JO1P2014
0520; Donna L. Leger, Bitcoin PioneerFacing Federal Charges Quits Foundation, USA
TODAY (Jan. 28, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.constory/tech/2014/01/28/shremresigns-from-bitcoin-foundation/4961903/; United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
230 See, e.g., Jonathan Greig, Healthcare Organizations in Ireland, New Zealand and
Canada Facing Intrusions and Ransomware Attacks, ZDNET (May 20, 2021),

https://www.zdnet.com/article/healthcare-organizations-in-ireland-new-zealand-andcanada-facing-intrusions-and-ransomware-attacks/.
231 Jenna Greene, Playing Hot Potato: Regulators May Be Interested in Overseeing
Bitcoin, but It's Not Clear Which Can or Will., CORP. COUNSEL (June 1, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202655860491/Playing -Hot-Potato.
232 Frank J. Diekmann, Opinion, Diekmann: The Risk in the Currency & the Currency
of Risk, CREDIT UNION J. (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.cujournal.com/conference
/creditunions/opinion/diekmann-the-risk-in-the-currency-amp-the-currency-of-risk;
Bitcoin: More than a Bit Risky, FINRA (May 7, 2014), https://www.finra.org/investors/
alerts/bitcoin-more-bit-risky.
233 See Virtual Currencies: The Oversight role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: HearingBefore the S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 36 (2018) (statement of Jay
Clayton, Chairman of the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
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unpredictably taken occasional harsh stances, 24 a federal agency that has neither

lobbied Congress for statutory change nor issued its own rules is largely setting the
agenda. The attentive student thus plumbs SEC pronouncements and disciplinary
and similarly centered private claims for guidance while being cognizant of the
inevitable, more cemented regulation that lies ahead.
As of the fall of 2021, technology investment terms are proliferating. 25
"Non-fungible-tokens" 236 are inexplicably garnering millions of investment
dollars; meanwhile, a crude form of investor activism is tempting novices into
gamesmanship with hedge funds and registered professionals. 237 It has become
readily accepted that half of all new online brokerage accounts shall commence on
an app that is approximately eight years old.238
In the context of this wild frontier, the delayed governmental response to the
$2 trillion market in cryptocurrency 239 is alarming. To wit, the majority of the cases
brought by the SEC could have been brought against dubious promoters similarly
touting running shoes; the overwhelming majority of these actions - while high
profile - have been settled without meaningful contests.
Congress has adopted the spirit and letter of Token 2.0 by introducing in
October 2021 a bill repeating most of the phrases and aims on Commissioner
Peirce's wish list.240 The bill garnered little press and has not quelled the storm
surrounding Chair Gensler's anticipated rulemaking.
Therefore, the Token Proposals, as catalysts, are priceless. More specifically,

Evan Weinberger, Fidelity Gets New York Charter for Bitcoin Trading,
19, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloom
berglawnews/banking-law/X3MUHR0000000?bna-newsfilter=banking-law#jcite.
235 See, e.g., Max Read, There's Nothing to Do Except Gamble/Welcome to the nonfungible, memeified, cryptodenominated, degeneratefuture offinance., N.Y. MAG. (Apr.
12, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/04/nft-future-of-money.html (noting that
pandemic stimulus has resulted in "$372 billion handed out to nearly half of the people in
the country with no strings attached").
236 Robyn Conti & John Schmidt, What You Need To Know About Non-Fungible
Tokens (NFTs), FORBES ADVISOR, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/nft-nonfungible-token/ (May 14, 2021, 12:17 PM).
234

BLOOMBERG L. (Nov.

237 Caitlin McCabe, A Week Inside the WallStreetBets Forum That Launched the

GameStop Frenzy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2021, 2:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aweek-inside-the-wallstreetbets-forum-that-launched-the-gamestop-frenzy-11613212202.
238 Robinhood,
which commenced online operations in 2013, boasts that
approximately half of 2020's new investors used its famed app. See Sheelah Kolhatkar,
Robinhood's Big Gamble, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2021), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2021/05/17/robinhoods-big-gamble.
239 See Conway, supra note 33.
240 See Clarity for Digital Tokens Act, H.R. 5496, 117th Cong. (2021). The
measure
was introduced by Congressman McHenry of North Carolina.
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Token Proposal 2.0 forces serious rulemaking while prioritizing the issue on a
crowded SEC agenda. 241 It recognizes existing law, precedential compromises, and
market realities. Most importantly, it moves the debate on proper SEC response to
the Division of Corporate Finance and away from the Division of Enforcement;
regarding the latter, it is worth repeating the old adage that a hammer sees
everything as a nail.
A more public forum for the rulemaking process and input is ultimately and
undeniably required.242 Yet, Commissioner Peirce has succeeded in jumpstarting a
debate that Commission officials in recent years have conveniently ignored.
Indeed, the latest official word from the Commission acknowledges that bitcoin
more readily fits under the commodity statutes243 and that a Congressional statute

is required. 2 " Those stances only prolong inaction.
For its part, the SEC Division of Enforcement has fought a laudable fight
against a largely anonymous foe. The seriousness of this battle cannot be
overstated: on a recurring basis, fraudsters are luring the uninitiated into complex
schemes to purchase, trade, and/or digitally hold cryptocurrency.24 Alt-currency
launched Silk Road 246 and simultaneously provided the most provocative return on
investment available. The Commission would be ignoring its raison d'etre should

It bears noting that new SEC Chairman Gary Gensler is experienced enough to
end regulatory impasse in digital currency regulation. A former CFTC Chairman, Mr.
Gensler taught a class on cryptocurrency at MIT. See Peter Dizikes, MIT Sloan's Gary
241

Gensler to be Nominated for Chair of Securities and Exchange Commission, MIT NEWS

(Jan. 19, 2021), https://news.mit.edu/2021/gary-gensler-nominated-chair-sec-0119.
242 Namely, since 1946, the Administrative Procedures Act has required that all
agency rulemaking be transparent by requiring publication in the Federal Register and the
opportunity for public comment thereon. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
243 See Robert Schmidt & Ben Bain, From Archegos to Crypto, Gensler Signals Cop
Is Back on Beat, BLOOMBERG L. (May 7, 2021, 5:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2021-05-06/from-archegos-to-crypto-sec-chief-signals-cop-is-back-onbeat.
24 See De, supra note 147 ("[F]ederal securities regulator, Gensler said the SEC's
authority is restricted to securities and products or asset managers that might invest in
cryptocurrencies. But he suggested Congress could take a role in bringing greater
regulatory clarity, particularly around exchanges.").
245 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investor Alert: Watch Outfor FraudulentDigital

Asset and "Crypto" Trading Websites, INVESTOR.GOV
(Apr. 24,
2019),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alertsbulletins/investor-alerts/investor-3.
246 A "dark web" phenomena, the Silk Road website sold illegal drugs and offered
other nefarious services until its anonymous founder/operator was located by the FBI and
prosecuted by the DOJ. He is serving a life sentence in prison. Nathan Reiff, Who is Ross
Ulbricht?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/tech/ross-ulbricht-dark-netpirate/ (Oct. 3, 2021).
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it focus solely on investor education and capital formation.247 Further, to its credit,
the agency commenced its litigation with a Ponzi schemer, and deliberately moved
to announce its position on tokens before the vast majority of cyber actions. Yet,
the fact remains that the issuance of digital coins is a growing business model, and
that SEC disciplinary action can sometimes take funds away from third-party
purchasers/investors. 248

Formal registration of a coin issuance - likely as an "IPO" - remains costly;
moreover, the IPO itself is waning in popularity. 249 Further, those opposing direct
government regulation have succeeded in directing the narrative towards the free
market.

250

A decade ago, the policy needed to be driven by the government

litigators. Now, cryptocurrency is backed by institutions and invested in by
millions. Indeed, the next (and possibly larger) battle is already here: The
manipulation of the numerous cryptocurrency markets. SEC applications of those
platforms to Section 9(a) of the 1934251 Act would do much to quell unrest among
American investors. 2 2 Adding to the time pressure is the undeniable fact that the
SEC's generous "whistleblowing" rewards - aided by a skilled marketplace of

Since its historic inception, the Commission's purpose has been tied to a threepart mission, although enforcement of the federal securities laws may often seem to be its
most fervent priority. See What We Do, SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, https://www.SEC.gov
/about/what-we-do (Dec. 18, 2020) (listing the three, equal goals of protecting investors,
facilitating capital formation, and protecting markets).
248 Purchasers of Ripple coins have sued to intervene in the pending SEC lawsuit. See
Word on the Block, Lawyerfor 11,000 XRP holderspushing to fight SEC in Ripple lawsuit,
FORKAST (Apr. 8, 2021, 2:14 PM), https://forkast.news/video-audio/xrp-fight-sec-ripplelawsuit/.
249 Apart from the cheaper alternative of a SPAC offering, IPOs subject the issuer to
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77k; See Tom
Huddleston Jr., What is a SPAC? Explaining one of Wall Street's hottest trends, CNBC
(Jan. 30, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/30/what-is-a-spac.html. The
notorious Section 11 provision, imposing liability for even negligent misstatements or
omissions, does not accord the issuer itself the due diligence defense. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
250 The latest relevant bill in Congress is titled "Elimination Barriers to Innovation
Act of 2021" and would include officials from the SEC and CFTC as voices among many
in a "working group" suggesting regulation. See Nikhilesh De, US Lawmakers Introduce
Bill to Clarify Crypto regulations, COINDESK (Mar. 9, 2021, 7:16 AM),
247

https://www.coindesk.com/lawmakers-digital-asset-regulation.
251 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a).
252 See Patrick McHale & Yueqi Yang, Bitcoin Tumbles After Musk Implies Tesla
May Sell Cryptocurrency, BLOOMBERG L. (May 16, 2021, 2:52 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-16/musk-implies-tesla-may-sell-orhas-sold-bitcoin-holdings (explaining that tweets by Tesla CEO Elon Musk "lopped nearly
$10,000 off the price of Bitcoin in hours last Wednesday after saying Tesla wouldn't take
it for cars.").
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attorneys - will expand to include tips on wrongdoing in digital asset deals. 2 3
The Commission is no longer on mute, but perhaps its mighty voice needs to
move past the Ponzi schemers and techno developers to scold the mega-players
that move crypto prices like pawns on a chessboard. 2 4 Time is not an ally in this
conflict, for the number of cryptocurrencies proliferates as the attendant dollar
volumes grow exponentially. 25 The merciless clock started by Nakomoto needs to
be reset, the SEC is the best clocksmith, and such adjustment needs to be
characterized by compromise rather than court pleadings. Against this difficult,
dynamic, new Millenia backdrop, Commissioner Peirce's proposal serves as a
ready blueprint for the tsunami of opinions that shall ultimately crystallize into
SEC rule.

253

See, e.g., Cryptocurrency Fraud, CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP (Jan.
3, 2022),

https://constantinecannon.com/practice/whistleblower/whistleblower-types/financialinvestment-fraud/ cryptocurrency-fraud/ (stating "as crypto scams and fraud becomes more
common, it will continue to be crucial for whistleblowers to help the SEC, CFTC, and IRS
with their enforcement efforts"). Since created in response to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,
the SEC Office of the Whistleblower has awarded over $900 million to qualified tipsters.
See WhistleblowerAwards Over $1 Billionfor Tips Resulting in Enforcement Actions, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N. (June 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower100million.
254 CryptocurrencyFraud, supra note
253.
255 See Conway, supra note
33.

